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A CAP ON THE DEFENDANT’S APPEAL BOND?: 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES TORT REFORM 
Doug Rendleman* 
In the spring of 2006, “Appeal Bond Reform,” was the first subject 
on the American Tort Reform Association’s website entry for “Issues.”1  
That entry may draw a blank and spur a curious Web-surfer to ask, 
“What’s an appeal bond?” and “OK, why does the appeal bond need 
reformed?” 
I.  ITINERARY 
To inquire into the world of the appeal bond, to ask how it came to 
the American Tort Reform Association agenda, to trace its history as tort 
reform, and to draw some constitutional and public policy lessons are 
my modest goals for this article. 
The appeal bond has been an issue in huge-damages litigation.  I 
 
* Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee.  This article, which was a long time in gestation, began 
with my critical report on Virginia’s and the other tobacco-states’ “first wave” of appeal-bond 
capping statutes in the 2001 annual supplement to DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA (2d ed. 1994).  Although the piece retains some Virginia 
attributes, enthusiastic and zealous research assistants, Ms. Bryony Renner, Mr. Andrew Howard 
and Mr. Tim Dooley caught the “second wave” of tort-reform capping statutes and transmogrified it 
to a national article.  Mr. Howard’s and Mr. Dooley’s extraordinary computer research on the state 
appeal-bond rules and statutes and their legislative histories broadened, expanded, and heightened 
my research and writing.  Ms. Rachel Sederquest assisted with citations in the summer of 2006.  
Grateful thanks to those assistants.  Thanks also to the Francis Lewis Law Center both for 
supporting my assistants and for augmenting my efforts with a research grant for the summer of 
2005.  In addition to my intellectual debts to lawyers and scholars that I have recognized in the 
footnotes, conversations with Professor Margaret Howard, Professor Lewis LaRue, and Mr. Mark 
Behrens helped me shape and direct my thinking; however, the conclusions herein are my own.  
During the later part of its incubation, I presented this work three times: to a Faculty Enclave at 
Washington and Lee in March 2005; to the Remedies Discussion Forum in November 2005, which 
led to this symposium; and to an AALS Remedies Section program on Tort Reform in January 
2006.  Thanks to all colleagues and commentators at the enclave, the forum, and the section 
program.  Special thanks to Professor Elaine Shoben for her consistent collegiality, support, and 
encouragement.  
 1. American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/issues (last visited May 9, 2006). 
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include a capsule summary of five lawsuits with blockbuster damages in 
this long paragraph.  The article will revisit them from time to time.  
They begin with Pennzoil v. Texaco from the 1980s in a Houston trial 
that stemmed from a corporate takeover gone awry.  Pennzoil’s jury 
verdict exceeded $10.5 billion.  Litigation continued in the Texas courts, 
the United States courts, including the Supreme Court, and the federal 
bankruptcy courts before the litigation was settled.2  The second lawsuit 
is O’Keefe v. Loewen, where a $500 million jury verdict was entered in a 
Mississippi lawsuit over two funeral home chains’ failed contracts; the 
parties settled it for about $175 million.3  The third case is the litigation 
that flowed from the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound 
that resulted in a $4.5 billion punitive damages verdict; after protracted 
litigation, including three trips to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
appellate court reduced the award to $2.5 billion in December 2006.4  
Our last two blockbuster verdicts were entered in smokers’ lawsuits 
against tobacco companies.  In case four, a smokers’ class action in 
Florida, Engle v. Liggett Group, the jury’s verdict for punitive damages 
for the plaintiff class was $145 billion.5  Finally, lawsuit five features 
Price v. Philip Morris, an Illinois smokers’ class action against tobacco 
where the plaintiffs’ verdict exceeded $10 billion.6  Both of our 
smokers’ class actions ended in appellate decisions that eliminated their 
gargantuan compensatory damages and punitive damages verdicts.7  To 
foreshadow this article’s conclusion, the Florida and Illinois courts’ 
decisions to reverse the two judgments confirm the point that an appeal-
bond cap that facilitates defendants’ appeals supports the legitimacy and 
accuracy of the litigation process. 
Notably, the two recent blockbuster lawsuits have had smoker 
plaintiffs and tobacco company defendants.  I will leave to others, 
particularly juries and judges, the dolorous duty of assessing the 
 
 2. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 
U.S. 994 (1988). 
 3. O’Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., No. 91-67-423 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1995), collaterally 
challenged, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, 42 I.L.M. 811, 825-827 (2003).  See 
also Jonathan Harr, A Reporter at Large: The Burial, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 95. 
 4. In re Exxon-Valdez, Nos. 04-35182, 04-35183, 2006 WL 3755189 (9th Cir. 2006).  The 
trial judge’s last opinion is well worth reading; it was In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d 1071, 
1084 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 5. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing 
and remanding), approved in part, quashed in part, Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. SC03-1856, 
2006 WL 3742610 (Fla. Dec. 21, 2006). 
 6. Price v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2003), rev’d, 
848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005), reh’g denied, 846 N.E.2d 597 (Ill. 2006). 
 7. Engle, 2006 WL 3742610, at *22; Price, 848 N.E.2d at 54-55. 
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heinousness or not of the tobacco companies’ conduct with their legal, 
but lethal, product as it affected their customers.  The appeal-bond caps 
that we are studying grew out of the smokers’ litigation and the tort-
reform movement. 
The appeal bond is a technical civil procedure and debtor-creditor 
subject in its own right.  Moreover, the appeal bond and the recent caps I 
examine border on several other legal thickets.  This article begins in 
Part II with background about appeal bonds and the way their amounts 
were set before tort reform.  Since the defendant’s cost of an appeal 
bond is an expense and, perhaps, an impediment to its appeal, the 
defendant will seek ways to surmount, reduce, or avoid the impediment.  
Part II then uses Pennzoil v. Texaco8 to illustrate two of defendants’ 
strategies for staying collection on a judgment pending review in lieu of 
posting a huge appeal bond—obtain a federal injunction and file for 
bankruptcy.  This article shows why neither strategy is sufficient: the 
federal court’s abstention doctrines militate against a federal injunction,9 
and the damages defendant’s option to file bankruptcy to achieve the 
shelter of an automatic stay turns out to be an unattractive alternative. 
Part II turns, finally, to the reason that appeal bonds caused 
defendants to writhe in earnest—titanic punitive damages jury verdicts.  
Tort reform, amended statutes and court rules capping appeal bonds, 
here enters our inquiry.  Tort reformers’ primary aim is to reduce or 
eliminate damages judgments.10  An appeal-bond cap is a secondary 
reform that facilitates the defendant’s appeal to a higher court; that 
appeal may, in turn, achieve one of the defendant’s primary goals of 
reducing or eliminating a particular judgment. 
Appeal-bond reform began in earnest in about 2000.  The last 
several years have seen two waves of appeal-bond-capping statutes and 
rules.  The article summarizes those developments in Parts III and IV.  
Part V includes the arguments the tort reformers made and discusses the 
legislative processes that facilitated the kind of tort reform involved in 
appeal-bond caps. 
In Part VI, the article moves from the legislative chamber back to 
the courtroom to examine whether federal and state constitutional 
 
 8. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 9. Id. at 17. 
 10. American Tort Reform Association, About ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about (last visited 
May 9, 2006); see also Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: 
Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825 (1996) 
(noting that tort reform bills have been proposed every year since 1982, and the primary goal of 
such reforms is to protect corporations from excessive punitive damage awards). 
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challenges will undermine appeal-bond caps.  At the federal level, 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clause 
challenges raise less difficult issues than the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.  Enforcing a sister-state judgment requires an understanding of 
the way the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the accompanying state law 
affect an appeal-bond cap.  Finally, the article’s last major subject 
touches on the nettlesome and speculative topic of litigants’ state 
constitutional challenges to appeal-bond caps. 
The article ends with an unpretentious conclusion in Part VII that 
some appeal-bond protection for large verdict judgment debtors is 
warranted in this age of mass litigation and titanic punitive damages 
awards, even though the protection will delay plaintiffs’ collection 
efforts.  That said, I support reform that is more circumspect than much 
of the appeal-bond tort-reform legislation that legislatures have enacted.  
That reform would, in brief, start with a presumptive full-amount appeal 
bond and (1) grant trial courts discretion to reduce the amount or provide 
alternative security, for good cause; and (2) provide for a cap on the 
punitive component of the award but not on the compensatory 
component.  This would permit the appellate review necessary to confer 
legitimacy, ensure correction of trial court error, and facilitate the more 
rigorous post verdict review of punitive awards that is required by the 
Supreme Court’s recent due-process decisions.  At the same time, it 
would provide security for a plaintiff’s post-review collection on the 
judgment. 
II.  THE BASIC STUFF 
Part II examines the varied and sometimes technical issues that will 
enable the reader to understand how and why appeal-bond tort reform 
appeared on legislative agendas.  It, first, examines the important, yet 
conflicting purposes of the appeal bond—to facilitate appellate review of 
the accuracy and legitimacy of the jury’s verdict, while also providing 
security for the plaintiff’s collection efforts if the verdict is ultimately 
affirmed in whole or in part upon appeal.  Part II also emphasizes that in 
the case in which the appeal bond may be the hardest for a judgment 
debtor to muster—a verdict comprised in part of a huge punitive damage 
award, the “Big One”—appellate review of the verdict is particularly 
important and may result in elimination or substantial reduction of the 
punitive award, under state statutory and federal due-process limitations 
on punitive damages.  Part II next discusses, in yeoman-like fashion, 
post-verdict motions in the trial court, appellate review, the practical 
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issues involved in obtaining an appeal bond, and the ways in which a 
court sets the amount of an appeal bond prior to the recent waves of 
appeal-bond tort reform legislation.  Part II then completes its 
description of tremendous punitive damage awards that set the stage for 
appeal-bond tort-reform legislation by examining two anodynes to cure a 
defendant’s need to post a huge appeal bond, the federal injunction and 
bankruptcy, that failed as antidotes.   
Part II, finally, presents the judgment debtor’s dilemma, which led 
judgment debtors to turn to legislators for assistance, and which, in turn, 
led to appeal-bond tort-reform: Judgment debtors facing the biggest 
verdicts, which include huge punitive damages components, had 
significant opportunities to eliminate or reduce the amount of the 
punitive award on appeal.  Given the amount of the verdicts, however, 
some judgment debtors could not mount an appeal because they were 
financially unable to post the bond.  So, on to the basics. 
A.   What’s an appeal bond? 
Suppose TortCo made defective Gizmos, a product that injured or 
killed lots of people.  The victims sue TortCo.  TortCo will suffer money 
judgments in favor of the Gizmo’s victims.  We will focus here on one 
huge jury verdict for plaintiff Victor for $250 million, $225 million of it 
punitive damages.11  If TortCo or its insurer doesn’t pay Victor’s 
judgment, Victor will collect it out of TortCo’s assets.  Many tortfeasor-
businesses have suffered the consequences of judgments and debts that 
they cannot pay.  Those consequences are insolvency and 
dismemberment in or out of bankruptcy. 
 
 11. The jury based Victor’s products liability judgment against TortCo on the defendant’s 
fraud and reckless disregard; these findings opened the door for her to recover the $225 million 
punitive damages.  TortCo, the corporate defendant, carried products liability insurance with its 
twin benefits, the insurance company’s duties to defend and indemnify its insured.  Although 
TortCo’s insurance carrier was vigorous on its behalf during the trial, some issues between the two 
persist.  A policy maximum that limits the carrier’s payments potentially exposes TortCo’s assets to 
Victor’s collection.  Also, a policy exclusion for TortCo’s intentional misconduct may mean that 
TortCo is responsible for all of the punitive damages portion of the judgment.  The debate about 
whether a potential tort defendant may insure against its liability for punitive damages is 
summarized in Catherine M. Sharkey’s article, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 
MD. L. REV. 409 (2005).  Finally, a corporation like TortCo that files bankruptcy will neither claim 
exempt property, nor secure a discharge of its debts.  In any event, a plaintiff’s judgment for 
punitive damages will be likely to survive the defendant’s bankruptcy.  See, e.g., Cohen v. De La 
Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). 
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1.  Post-Verdict and Appellate Review 
The jury does not have the last word in our system.  The jury’s 
$250 million verdict for Victor is potentially vulnerable to elimination or 
reduction on TortCo’s post-verdict motion or on appellate review 
because of the huge punitive damages component of the verdict. 
Post-verdict review in the trial and appellate courts, however, 
serves competing goals.  From Victor’s perspective, “Justice delayed is 
justice denied.”  The litigants should achieve finality.  In particular, the 
winning plaintiff should be able to collect her money from a solvent 
defendant.  A procedural system cannot reconcile these principles with 
the loser’s appeal.  The loser’s appeal is, however, a fundamental feature 
of any system of adjudicatory decisionmaking that purports to provide 
accuracy and legitimacy.  A stay pending appeal represents the uneasy 
procedural standoff between these conflicting goals: the trial or appellate 
court ought to be able to stay, that is to halt, the plaintiff’s collection, but 
the defendant-appellant ought to provide security for the plaintiff.12 
Some rudimentary information about appeals reveals why the 
defendant-appellant ought to provide security during the period between 
judgment and completion of appellate review.  An average appeal takes 
about a year.  In 2005 in the federal system, the median time from the 
appellant’s filing of notice of appeal to the court of appeals’s final 
disposition was 11.8 months.13  The lawsuits involving huge amounts of 
punitive damages that this article features take longer at every stage, 
some a lot longer.14 
Delay is the defendant’s friend.  If the defendant’s cost of capital is 
less than the judgment interest rate, the friendship will be intimate.  In 
the debates on an appeal-bond cap in the Alaska Senate Judiciary 
Committee as recorded in its Minutes, State Senator Ogan maintained 
that 
one corporate strategy is the time-value of money and, although he 
believes the size of the judgments are outrageous, the corporate 
attorneys will wait the plaintiffs out.  He noted that many participants 
in the Exxon Valdez case have died while the case has been held up.  
He cautioned if the bar is set too low, the defendant will play the time-
 
 12. See AM. LAW INST./UNIDROIT, ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 150-52 (2006). 
 13. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 15 (2005), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/judbus2005/front/judicialbusiness.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004) (continuing litigation 
in 2004 regarding a jury verdict for $5 billion punitive damages for an incident 15 years earlier, in 
March 1989).  In re Exxon-Valdez, 2006 WL 3755189.   
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value of money game.15 
A corporation lives forever, but an individual plaintiff’s time 
horizon is always shorter.16  Victor is anxious to collect her $250 million 
verdict, but TortCo will seek post-verdict judicial review.  Rules and 
statutes provide an automatic period of plaintiff’s non-collection, a 
period of time after the judgment before her collection techniques can 
begin.17  Filing motions in the trial court and mounting an appeal to a 
higher court comprise the defendant’s post-verdict judicial review.18  
Since post-verdict judicial review can last for several years and may lead 
to reduction of the plaintiff’s damages or reversal of her judgment, 
during that period the parties often negotiate toward a settlement to end 
the delay and uncertainty. 
2.  Post-Verdict Motions in the Trial Court 
The defendant’s post-verdict motions in the trial court include a 
judgment as a matter of law or j.n.o.v. motion for a new trial because of 
error, and a motion for a new trial because an excessive verdict should 
be remitted, that is, reduced.  The defendant’s post-verdict motions do 
not stay the plaintiff’s collection, but the trial judge may stay plaintiff’s 
enforcement pending a decision on the defendant’s motions.19 
The jury’s verdict for the plaintiff becomes a money judgment 
when, after ruling on the defendant’s post-verdict motions, the trial 
judge signs and enters a judgment and the clerk enters it on the formal 
docket or record.20  When the judgment is officially entered, the clock 
starts to run on two important deadlines: the date when the plaintiff may 
begin to collect her judgment, and the defendant’s period to file its 
notice of appeal. 
Plaintiff becomes a judgment creditor.  She qualifies, after an 
interval, for access to the defendant-judgment debtor’s assets.  After that 
 
 15. Alaska State Legislature, Senate Judiciary Standing Committee Minutes, Feb. 20, 2004, at 
17, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/SJUD2004-02-200805.PDF. 
 16. ALLEN C. BLUEDORN, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION OF TIME: TEMPORAL REALITIES AND 
EXPERIENCE 111-45 (2002) (describing a 250-year corporate plan for Matsushita, at 136). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a) (ten days after entry of judgment); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-466 
(2000) (twenty-one days after judgment). 
 18. Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries: Comparing 
the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1291-321 (1996) 
(reviewing the history and theory of post-verdict judicial review, summarizing what that review 
teaches us about the role of the judge versus the role of the jury, and applying the foregoing to 
criminal capital punishment and civil punitive damages). 
 19. FED.R.CIV.P. 62(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-477 (2000). 
 20. Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 315 P.2d 871 (Ariz. 1957). 
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period expires, the judgment creditor may utilize judgment-collection 
techniques, including garnishment, a judgment lien, and a writ of 
execution.21 
After the trial judge in O’Keefe v. Loewen denied the defendant’s 
post-verdict motions, the plaintiff’s lawyer prepared lists of defendant’s 
property and drafted notices.22  “‘They have ten days to post the [$625 
million] cash bond.  If they don’t, my client will proceed to take over 
their assets.  That’s every funeral home they own, every insurance 
company, every cemetery, their corporate jet, and their yacht.’”23 
3.  The Appeal and the Appeal Bond 
Lots of plaintiffs cannot collect their judgments, the particular 
turnips lacking any blood.  An insolvent judgment debtor can file 
bankruptcy to shuck its debts.  This article assumes that TortCo, the 
defendant-judgment debtor, has assets plus potential grounds for a 
successful appeal. 
The defendant that files its notice of appeal within the prescribed 
period becomes an appellant in addition to being a judgment debtor.  
Procedural rules and statutes accommodate the parties’ conflicting 
interests during the defendant’s appeal by providing for the defendant-
appellant to post an appeal bond and a supersedeas bond24 to stay or 
suspend plaintiff’s collection during the protracted appellate review.25  
The stays and appeal bonding procedures this article deals with are 
founded in rules and statutes.26 
Although the judgment debtor’s appeal bond performs important 
functions in the practical world of litigation, the legal system has not 
displayed it prominently on the marquee.  A trial lawyer, particularly a 
 
 21. DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA, Chps. 2, 3, 4 
(2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT]; 11 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2903 (2d ed. 1995). 
 22. Harr, supra note 3, at 92-93. 
 23. Id. at 70, 93-94 (quoting Willie Edward Gary, O’Keefe’s attorney). 
 24. “Supersedeas,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (8th ed. 2004) (Latin for “you shall 
desist.”). 
 25. Smoothing over the technical usage that an appellant’s lawyer cannot ignore, a 
supersedeas bond stays the judgment creditor from collecting the judgment amount, FED.R.CIV.P. 
62(d); an appeal bond secures the appellant’s costs on appeal, FED.R.APP.P. 7, which are usually a 
lot less than the judgment amount.  In this article, I am combining “appeal bond” and “supersedeas 
bond” into the phrase “appeal bond” because of the professional usage during the tort-reform 
debates. 
 26. In the absence of a rule or statute, a judge has an inherent power to stay litigation.  Landis 
v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).  For example, the judge may stay a plaintiff’s 
“duplicative” lawsuit to await a decision in the other case. 
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specialist in civil defense, must learn about bonding an appeal; but the 
appeal bond is little taught in law school and little known in the 
scholarly sphere.27 
The defendant’s appeal bond serves competing goals.  It will stay 
the plaintiff’s immediate collection, but it will also guarantee the 
plaintiff’s ability to collect her judgment if her damages verdict emerges 
from appellate review as a judgment that she can collect.28  Because a 
professional surety is a profit-making enterprise, the judgment debtor’s 
appeal bond with surety is not free.  A professional surety will charge 
the appellant a three-percent fee, called a bond premium, and typically 
will require security, in the form of cash collateral, other collateral, or an 
indemnitor.  The judgment debtor loses the bond premium, but it gains a 
breathing space during appellate review.  An appeal bond may affect the 
parties’ settlement negotiations.  In particular, the judgment creditor may 
use the prognosis of her opponent’s potentially expensive bond premium 
as a lever to exert pressure on it to settle on favorable terms. 
The prospect of paying a bond premium may discourage a 
defendant from pursuing a hopeless or frivolous appeal.  But a defendant 
that does maintain a frivolous appeal will owe interest on the judgment 
in the end, even without the bond.29  Moreover, the federal appellate 
rules and similar state rules have cost-shifting provisions to sanction an 
appellant that has taken a frivolous appeal.30 
Without the judgment debtor’s appeal bond, the judgment creditor 
could lose out in two ways.  First, the judgment creditor could fail to 
 
 27. The literature on the appeal bond includes two articles on Pennzoil’s lawsuit against 
Texaco in the 1980s: Elaine Carlson, Mandatory Supersedeas Bond Requirements - A Denial of Due 
Process Rights?, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 29 (1987) and Doug Laycock, The Remedies Issues: 
Compensatory Damages, Specific Performance, Punitive Damages, Supersedeas Bonds, and 
Abstention, 9 REV. LITIG. 473 (1990).  A useful short treatment from the commercial surety’s 
perspective is James Black, Jr., Miscellaneous Surety Bonds and the Restatement, 34 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1195, 1198-1201 (1993), which is part of a symposium on the Restatement [Third] of 
Suretyship (1996).  Also, Professor Mike Finch’s article is about what I call the “first wave” of 
appeal-bond caps.  See Michael Finch, Giving Full Faith and Credit to Punitive Damages Awards: 
Will Florida Rule the Nation?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 497 (2002).  And, in her brief treatment of appeal 
bonds as part of larger issues of punitive damages, Professor Cathy Sharkey endorses the caps that 
this article examines.  See Catherine M. Sharkey, Book Review: Punitive Damages: Should Juries 
Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381, 406-07 (2003) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, ET AL., PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)). 
 28. 20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL §§ 307.10-307.11 
(3d ed. 2006) (explaining the purposes of appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds). 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1961; Dan B. Dobbs, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 
3.6(6) (2d ed. 1993). 
 30. FED. R. APP. P. 38; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (2000).  See also, e.g., Kent v. White, 
631 S.E.2d 782, 783 n.2 (Ga. App. 2006) (noting several frivolous appeal sanctions). 
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collect her judgment because the judgment debtor transfers or pledges its 
assets.  However, a court would be likely to reverse or correct a 
judgment debtor’s transfer of assets to avoid paying its judgment 
creditor by holding that the debtor’s transfer was a fraudulent 
conveyance that the judgment creditor could recover.31  Second, if the 
judgment debtor grants a security interest in its assets or if another of the 
judgment debtor’s judgment creditors secures an attachment, execution, 
or judgment lien on the judgment debtor’s property that outranks the 
judgment creditor, then she may lose her priority in those assets to that 
competitor.32 
After her collection is stayed, the judgment creditor loses 
immediate access to the judgment debtor’s assets, but she gains security 
in collecting.  The defendant’s appeal bond gives the plaintiff, who is, 
for now, an unsecured creditor, the equivalent of a security interest 
because she is assured of collection from the bond.  So the judgment 
debtor’s appeal bond creates a risk to its other creditors because of the 
bond’s cost and because it gives the plaintiff-judgment creditor the 
equivalent of a security interest.33  But without the stay, the plaintiff’s 
unsecured status could have been short-lived.  The stay of plaintiff’s 
collection prevents her from levying a writ of execution that would 
create an execution lien on the defendant’s personal property or filing 
her judgment for a judgment lien on defendant’s realty. 
If the appellate court affirms her judgment, plaintiff can collect 
from the judgment debtor or directly from the judgment debtor’s appeal 
bond by levy of execution on it.34  If the bond surety pays the judgment, 
the surety may repay itself from the cash collateral the judgment debtor 
has supplied.  In addition, the surety may collect from an indemnitor or 
subrogate to the judgment creditor’s debt to enable it to collect from the 
judgment debtor.35 
 
 31. Kent, 631 S.E.2d at 784-85 (holding that the judgment debtor’s no-consideration deed to 
his daughter, which was recorded the day after the plaintiff’s judgment, was a fraudulent 
conveyance); Garrard Glenn, 1 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 67, at 107 (2d 
ed. 1940); RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 21, §7.3(B)(7). 
 32. Laycock, supra note 27, at 514. 
 33. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 
1986).  The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the plaintiff-judgment creditor was entitled to 
maintain his judgment lien on the defendant-judgment debtor’s land in addition to the security that 
the defendant had posted in lieu of a bond.  Fitch v. Valentine, No. 2006-CA-00239-SCT, 2007 WL 
64232 (Miss. Jan. 11, 2007). 
 34. Tauber v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kilgore, 562 S.E.2d 118, 132 (2002), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 1002 (2002) (holding that a successful judgment creditor may collect by execution on the 
appeal bond); Carlson, supra note 27 at 54; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 2905, at n.13. 
 35. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.3(4) (2d ed. 
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A defendant may appeal a trial court’s money judgment without 
posting an appeal bond.36  But, unless the plaintiff’s collection is stayed, 
she may collect her judgment from the defendant’s assets while the 
defendant’s appeal is pending.37  If, however, the appellate court later 
reverses the plaintiff’s judgment, the defendant may recover restitution 
from the unjustly enriched plaintiff.38  Restitution may be a scant 
comfort, however, to a defendant whose home was sold under execution 
following an incorrect judgment that is later reversed.39 
B.  Setting the Amount of an Appeal Bond Before Tort Reform 
Depending on the statute or rule, the defendant usually posted an 
appeal bond which was at least as large as the plaintiff’s judgment.  The 
bond was sometimes larger, sometimes smaller.  Again, the purpose of 
the appeal bond is twofold: (1) it permits the losing party to obtain 
appellate review which confers legitimacy on the verdict by providing a 
check on its accuracy; and (2) it provides security for plaintiff’s delayed 
collection if the verdict is upheld in whole or in part.  Before tort reform, 
the various jurisdictions in the United States used one of two different 
types of statutes or rules to set the amount of an appellant-judgment 
debtor’s appeal bond: (1) discretionary, or (2) mandatory, full-amount. 
 
1993) (contractual subrogation). 
 36. See, e.g., Nastro v. D’Onofrio, 822 A.2d 286, 289 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (describing a 
situation where a debtor appealed in California without a stay). 
 37. Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist., 113 F.Supp.2d 935, 939 (E.D. Va. 2000); Segal v. 
Segal, 863 A.2d 221, 226 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).  See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 2905, 
at n.14. 
 38. Gerald M. Moore and Son, Inc. v. Drewry and Assoc., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 117, 120 (E.D. 
Va. 1996); Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 18 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2001); Carlson, supra note 27, at 56; Laycock, supra note 27, at 503, 506-07 (adding special 
damages to restitution and describing defendant’s recovery as “damages,” which, since the 
defendant’s loss and the plaintiff’s gain are usually the same, is equal to restitution). 
 39. Sandra Fleishman, Foreclosure Scams on the Rise, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at D2 
(describing the plight of a homeowner who lost her home because she couldn’t afford to post a 
bond).  In the civil-rights movement libel litigation that ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376  U.S. 254 (1964), the newspaper’s co-
defendants were ministers who could not afford to post appeal bonds to stay the plaintiff’s 
collection of the $500,000 jury verdict during the appeals.  See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: 
THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162 (1991).  Their cars were seized and sold 
while the appeals were pending.  Id.  After the Supreme Court reversed the verdict, the defendants 
got the money back.  Id.  Reverend Joseph Lowery’s car had been sold for $800.  Id.  The execution 
buyer, who was a member of Lowery’s church, had sold it back to Lowery’s wife for $1.  Id.  
“‘When the Supreme Court vindicated us,’” Lowery said, “‘the state [sic] had to return the money 
that it got for the cars.  I offered it back to the member who’d helped me, but he wouldn’t take it.  
The money went into the [civil-rights] movement.’”  Id.  See also, TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE 
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 580 (1988). 
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1.  Discretionary 
The federal procedure and some states’ procedures start setting the 
defendant’s appeal bond with the amount of the plaintiff’s judgment as a 
rule of thumb and then grant the trial judge discretion, if the judgment 
debtor shows good cause, to reduce the bond’s amount below the 
amount of the judgment or to change the form of security. 
In the federal court, after the defendant moves for a stay, the judge 
has discretion to stay the plaintiff’s collection.40  After a plaintiff’s 
money verdict and a defendant’s appeal, the judge may, and typically 
does, condition the stay on the defendant’s posting of a surety bond for 
an appellant’s stay after the ten-day automatic stay. 
As a matter of right, a federal-court judgment debtor may stay the 
judgment creditor’s collection by posting an appeal bond.  The judgment 
debtor’s bonds will usually be large enough to cover costs, the judgment, 
and post-judgment interest.41  The stay is effective when the judge 
approves it.42  A federal court of appeals or a justice of the Supreme 
Court may grant further stays.43 
However, if the judgment debtor shows “good cause,” the federal 
judge has discretion to dispense with an appeal bond or to set a lower 
bond.  The judgment debtor’s good-cause factors include its solvency, its 
high net worth, its illiquid assets, whether the judgment debtor will 
provide periodic reports, and the judgment debtor’s financial burden 
from the bond.44  Although the judgment debtor’s security will usually 
take the form of a bond with surety, the judge may choose an alternate 
form, for example treasury bills, a letter of credit, or a document 
granting the judgment creditor a security interest.45 
 
 40. FED.R.CIV.P. 62(b); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 
796 (7th Cir. 1986); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 281 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
 41. Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist., 113 F. Supp. 2d 935, 939 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 42. FED.R.CIV.P. 62(d); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 2905. 
 43. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2)(E); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 3954. 
 44. See also N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 281 (explaining that the bond was waived 
because (1) plaintiff cross appealed and sought specific performance instead of money damages and 
(2) defendant was “good for the $181 million”); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 786 F.2d at 796 
(explaining alternative security when an appeal bond will create a risk to defendant’s other 
creditors). 
 45. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 786 F.2d at 796 (listing possible alternative measures: 
security interest, no-transfer order, and accelerated oral argument); C. Albert Sauter Co. v. Richard 
Sauter Co., 368 F. Supp. 501, 520-21 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that where defendant lacks assets for 
a bond, the alternative was to escrow stock securities).  In Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 42 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), the parties had stipulated for treasury bills instead of a bond 
for the stay.  See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 2905, at n.12. 
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2.  Mandatory-Full Amount 
The Texas statute that the courts applied in Pennzoil v. Texaco was, 
by contrast, absolute.  To stay the plaintiff’s collection, the defendant-
appellant had to post a bond at least equal to the amount of the 
judgment.46  Other full-amount appeal bond procedures added interest or 
an interest surrogate, for example bonding an appeal at 125% of the 
judgment amount, as did Mississippi while O’Keefe v. Loewen was 
underway.47  When this article refers to a full-amount appeal bond, it is 
referring to either the full judgment amount or to that amount augmented 
for interest. 
Under a mandatory rule or statute, to secure a stay, the judgment 
debtor must post a bond equal to the amount of the judgment, usually 
plus interest.48  Indeed, in the absence of a statutory cap, the Virginia 
Supreme Court said that a state trial judge does not have “inherent 
authority” to set a solvent judgment debtor’s surety bond at less than the 
judgment.49  “The purpose of the statute,” the court continued, “is to 
secure payment of the full judgment amount and all damages incurred as 
a result of the suspension of execution of the court’s decree.”50  Any 
“lesser amount would undermine the security of the judgment to which a 
prevailing party is entitled in the event that an appellant does not 
succeed on appeal.”51 
The discretionary procedures for setting the amount of an appeal 
bond are tort-reform targets, but the full-amount bonding requirements 
have been the most vulnerable to tort reform. 
 
 46. I use the past tense to summarize the mandatory appeal bond provisions—because of 
appeal-bond reform, our subject, many of these provisions were amended.  Appeal-bond reform 
occurred in Texas after Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (l987).  See Laycock, supra note 
27, at 502 n.92.  The current Texas statute on the amount for an appeal bond mandates that a 
defendant post the judgment amount, the costs, and interest, but limits the aggregate amount to half 
of the judgment debtor’s net worth or $25 million.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
52.006 (Vernon, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. of the 79th Leg.). 
 47. See, e.g., MISS. R. APP. PROC. 8(a) (requiring a supersedeas bond to stay the lower court’s 
judgment at 125% of the judgment amount). 
 48. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 49. Tauber v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kilgore, 562 S.E.2d 118, 131-32 (2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1002 (2002).  An indigent Virginia judgment debtor is exempted from the security 
requirement.  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(N) (2000). 
 50. Tauber, 562 S.E.2d at 132.  The plaintiff’s remedy in the circuit court below was a 
constructive trust; on appeal, the Supreme Court increased the amount.  Id. at 132-33.  A Virginia 
appellate court may increase or decrease security.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(E) (2000). 
 51. Tauber, 562 S.E.2d at 132-33. 
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C.  Why does the appeal bond need reformed? 
One significant development has drawn the appeal bond out of the 
courthouse’s quotidian world and thrust it into the political spotlight: 
huge verdicts for punitive damages perforce dictate huge appeal bonds.  
For example, in two of Exxon’s appeals from the jury’s $5 billion 
punitive damages verdict stemming from the Exxon-Valdez’s massive 
oil spill in Prince William Sound, it posted security of $6,750,000,000 
and $4,806,000,000.52 
A large appeal bond costs a defendant large money.  The cost of an 
appeal bond on a multi-billion verdict may be staggering, even for a 
large corporation.  A professor “shopping” for an appeal bond,53 learned 
that, for a common-garden appeal, the bond surety will charge the 
defendant three percent of the face amount of the bond.54  The bond 
surety will require the defendant to supply cash collateral, an irrevocable 
letter of credit that will remain safe in the defendant’s bankruptcy. 
What about the “Big One”?  For an appeal bond in the tens of 
millions, hundreds of millions, or billions of dollars amounts that this 
article discusses, the surety will also be talking about lack of capacity, 
multiple sureties, banks, and reinsurers.  This will be likely to elicit yet 
another howl of pain from the judgment debtor, already wounded by the 
jury’s verdict. 
Many large jury verdicts occur in medical malpractice, patent, 
antitrust, and high-profile business litigation.55  In the last few years, as I 
will discuss below, many large verdicts have been for smokers, or their 
estates, against tobacco companies.  Most of the large recent verdicts 
this article focuses on have included a copious dollop of punitive 
damages.  Professor Sharkey observes that punitive damages are “the 
usual driving force in multimillion (or billion) dollar awards.”56 
A plaintiff’s judgment for a large amount of punitive damages is, 
 
 52. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (D. Alaska 2002) (supersedeas bond of 
$6.75 billion); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084 (D. Alaska 2004) (supersedeas bond 
of $4.806 billion).  In re Exxon-Valdez, 2006 WL 3755189.   
 53. Appeal bonds are available from a variety of sources.  See, e.g., Appealbond.com, 
http://www.appealbond.com (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
 54. But see the following cases containing judicial estimates of one percent: Olympia Equip. 
Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1986) (“which (we surmise) is 1 
percent”); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 281 (7th Cir. 1986); 
Lightfoot v. Walker, 797 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 55. Pamela A. MacLean, Securities Class Action Trials on the Rise, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, 
at A1, 16. 
 56. Catherine Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Caps, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 391, 393 (2005). 
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however, vulnerable to post-verdict reduction or reversal if the 
consequent huge appeal bond does not prevent or seriously hinder an 
appeal.  The first jury verdict against Merck for a wrongful death 
involving Vioxx, for example, was for $253.4 million, which included 
$229 million in punitive damages.57  Merck planned to appeal.  First, a 
Texas state statute that caps a plaintiff’s punitive damages award at 
double her “economic” damages would reduce the punitive damages to 
$1.6 million and the total judgment to $26.1 million.  Second, the 
reduced award would be subject to further reduction by the trial judge 
and on appeal.58 
Large punitive damages verdicts are particularly susceptible to 
reduction under the Supreme Court’s specialized post-verdict due-
process review.59  In particular, in 1996, the Court in BMW v. Gore 
established guideposts for a court to use to evaluate whether punitive 
damages are excessive enough to violate the Due Process Clause: the 
defendant’s reprehensibility, the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages, and the civil penalty for the defendant’s 
misconduct.60  Then in State Farm v. Campbell in 2003, the Court 
suggested that a 9/1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
was the limit except in rare cases.61 
The Supreme Court’s Gore and Campbell decisions also illustrate a 
transition in litigation leading to punitive damages.  From punitive 
damages as a judicial sanction to punish an individual defendant’s 
interpersonal vile behavior, common-law courts have fashioned punitive 
damages as an adjunct of consumer protection, a way for a court to 
punish a business for predatory behavior.62  In Gore, a consumer sued a 
business claiming that its product was deceptively marketed;63 in 
Campbell, consumers sued their insurance company for “bad faith” 
tactics.64  Punitive damages, in order to punish a malefactor, should 
 
 57. Marc Kaufman, Texas Jury Finds Merck Liable in Vioxx Death, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 
2005, at A1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003); BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 60. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75. 
 61. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 62. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 
(2005) (describing the development of exemplary damage theory and proposing a modern 
approach). 
 63. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563-64.  Specifically, the defendant failed to advise its dealers and 
customers of damage and repainting that occurred prior to delivery at the dealerships.  Id. 
 64. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 413-14 (noting that the insurance company contested liability 
without cause to do so). 
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sting—it takes big money to hurt a big business.  Consumer-protection 
punitive damages raise a host of issues that I will summarize with one 
word: “excessiveness.”65  The Supreme Court’s Gore and Campbell 
decisions also show judicial tort reform of consumer-protection punitive 
damages.  The Court developed post-verdict judicial review based in the 
Due Process Clause as a principle of confinement to prevent 
excessiveness as abuse of punitive damages. 
My skeptical view of the wisdom and workability of the Court’s 
Due-Process “guideposts” should be apparent to a reader of the punitive 
damages parts of my Remedies casebook.66  Augmented post-verdict 
judicial review of punitive damages is, however, The Law that a 
pragmatist must learn to live with.67 
D.  The Judgment Debtor’s Strategies—Federal Injunction and 
Bankruptcy 
If the judgment debtor-defendant is unable to post an appeal bond 
and not willing to appeal without one, the plaintiff’s punitive damages 
verdict and judgment may evade appellate review.  In short, while 
analysts, stock market speculators, short sellers, creditors, and the 
investing public watch TortCo, its solvency may hang in the balance as 
it negotiates a generous settlement with Victor.  The difficulty Texaco 
faced in the 1980s after Pennzoil’s Texas jury verdict for $10.53 billion 
resembles TortCo’s plight. 
In Pennzoil v. Texaco, plaintiff sued defendant in Houston, Texas.  
The locale and forum comported with plaintiff’s tactics for three 
reasons: (1) a Houston jury would be disposed to accept Pennzoil’s 
argument for a contract—that “a deal’s a deal;” (2) the jury would then 
award Pennzoil a large verdict for damages; (3) Texas procedure 
required the defendant to post a liquid appeal bond equal to the 
judgment.68  The jury, vindicating Pennzoil’s tactics, accepted 
Pennzoil’s argument by awarding Pennzoil a $10.53 billion verdict, $3 
billion of which was punitive damages. 
 
 65. DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 151-55 (7th Ed. 2006) 
[hereinafter RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES]. 
 66. Id. at 122-60l.  See also Ron Krotoszynski, Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and 
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental 
Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 974-86, 1017-19 (2006). 
 67. See Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards, 39 AKRON 
L. REV. 1019 (2006). 
 68. KEVIN DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: HOW CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE 
CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 156-158 (1992). 
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In the debates on the appeal bond cap in Nevada, State Senator 
James related the severe effects of Texaco’s inability to post a bond: 
I worked for Baker Botts Limited Liability Partnership, in Houston, 
and we represented Pennzoil-Quaker State Company.  After we 
admitted the case, it was $12 billion from the jury, $3.5 billion, after it 
was admitted it was the largest civil judgment in history.  We all went 
across the country recording liens on Texaco property in every state.  
They were not able to get a bond and filed a bankruptcy petition 
because of the supersedes [sic] bond, which is why they ended taking 
Texaco through bankruptcy.  I have personal experience with what 
happens.  It is an unforgiving requirement.  . . .  [T]here is no 
exception in the law.  If you cannot post a bond, you are finished and 
cannot appeal.69 
As will be demonstrated, two important strategies of the judgment-
debtor that is seeking to avoid posting a huge appeal bond—seeking a 
federal court injunction and filing for bankruptcy protection—will either 
be legally unavailable or unappealing. 
1.  Federal Injunction 
Texaco’s first strategy was to seek a federal injunction.  Arguing 
that Texas’s mandatory, full-amount appeal bond effectively prevented it 
from appealing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Texaco sought the shelter of a federal injunction against 
the Texas proceeding.70 
Eventually, in a diffuse decision, the United States Supreme Court 
declined Texaco’s invitation to the federal court to enjoin the Texas state 
litigation.71  Although three justices maintained that Texaco had no 
claim on the merits, the Court’s basic holding was that Younger 
abstention barred Texaco’s injunction action: a federal judge, the Court 
held, should not grant a state-court civil defendant a federal injunction to 
bar ongoing state litigation, even unconstitutional state litigation, when 
the federal plaintiff could secure adequate constitutional review in the 
 
 69. Revising Provisions Concerning Stay of Execution and Appeal of Certain Judgments: 
Hearing Before the Judiciary Comm. on Assembly Bill 576 , 71st Session (2001) [hereinafter 
Nevada Testimony] (statement of Sen. James, Chairman, Judiciary Comm.), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/1252.html (last viewed Sept. 5, 2006). 
 70. In a little more detail, Texaco argued that the Texas full-amount appeal bond denied it an 
appeal and due process, because, even though it could afford to pay the judgment, it nevertheless 
could not afford to post the bond.  Laycock, supra note 27, at 502, 511-16. 
 71. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 9 (1987). 
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state court system.72 
If TortCo or another contemporary punitive-damages defendant 
were to seek shelter from a state’s full-amount appeal bond under the 
umbrella of a federal injunction, the Supreme Court’s decision against 
Texaco’s request is precedent for the tort plaintiffs.73 
After the federal courts declined to assist Texaco, the Houston 
jury’s verdict and judgment were affirmed on direct appeal in Texas.74 
2.  Bankruptcy 
Texaco’s second tactic was to file for bankruptcy.  Eventually 
Texaco, still solvent, but with Pennzoil’s unpaid judgment hanging over 
its corporate head, filed a Chapter 11, corporate-reorganization, 
bankruptcy.  The bankruptcy court’s automatic stay barred the judgment 
creditor’s efforts to collect.75  The automatic stay served Texaco as the 
practical equivalent of an appeal bond.76  In the shadow of the 
bankruptcy court’s automatic stay, Texaco and Pennzoil settled for about 
20% of the jury verdict while Texaco paid its other creditors in full.77 
Today, however, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy may not be available to a 
solvent corporation seeking to use the automatic stay to delay a 
judgment creditor’s efforts to collect a judgment.  For example, a solvent 
antitrust defendant, seeking to improve its negotiating position with the 
 
 72. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 10; Laycock, supra note 27, at 501 n.90, 516.  Henry v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), decided by a federal court of appeals before 
the Court decided Texaco v. Pennzoil, is not precedent to the contrary.  The federal plaintiffs were 
civil rights organizations and active members.  Henry, 595 F.2d at 295.  The federal court of appeals 
rejected defendants’ abstention arguments and affirmed a federal preliminary injunction that barred 
state-court plaintiffs’ collection of an unbonded damages judgment from the federal plaintiffs.  Id. at 
307.  The court of appeals hinged the Henry decision on the federal plaintiffs’ free-speech rights, 
not on due process; moreover, Henry was a civil-rights era decision that a federal court would 
probably not decide the same way today.  Id.; cf. Laycock, supra note 27, at 516, 521-22. 
 73. Laycock, supra note 27, at 520 (Pennzoil was an “easy” abstention case). 
 74. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), (suggesting remittitur of 
$2 billion punitive damages because excessive writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 
(1988).  The Pennzoil litigation also had an ironic role in tort reform. 
Both sides pretty much agree on one thing in the Texas tort reform battles: That the catalyst for the 
sea change goes by the name of Joe Jamail.  Specifically, it was the glad-handing, back-slapping 
bragging by the famed Houston trial lawyer as he was filmed for a 1987 CBS 60 Minutes 
investigation of the money pumped into elections for the state supreme court.  Jamail had by then 
donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to state supreme court candidates over the years, and he 
also had recently seen his $10.5 billion victory for Pennzoil over Texaco upheld by the high court-
without so much as a hearing. 
Terry Carter, Tort Reform: Texas Style, ABA JOURNAL, October 2006, at 34. 
 75. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 76. Laycock, supra note 27, at 504. 
 77. DELANEY, supra note 68, at Ch. 5; Laycock, supra note 27, at 528-29. 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
2006] APPEAL BOND TORT REFORM 1107 
antitrust plaintiffs, filed bankruptcy where the automatic stay would 
stymie the plaintiffs’ collection efforts.  Then it submitted a Chapter 11 
plan that was unfavorable to the judgment creditor.  The court of appeals 
said that a defendant in litigation cannot file bankruptcy for tactical 
litigation advantage, but instead a Chapter 11 debtor must have a valid 
reorganization purpose.  The court dismissed the antitrust defendant’s 
Chapter 11 filing as not in good faith.78 
Even when it is available to a judgment debtor, bankruptcy is an 
odious alternative.  Bankruptcy is cumbersome and inconvenient, at best, 
because of its expense and because, even as a Chapter 11 debtor in 
possession, a company in bankruptcy loses a large measure of control.  
Congress’s (ill-advised) 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy statutes do 
not affect the preceding points. 
E.  The Defendant’s Dilemma 
Where do the developments summarized above leave a defendant 
like TortCo that is looking at the business end of a huge damages 
verdict?  While TortCo pursues reduction of Victor’s $250 million 
verdict on appeal, TortCo may lose many other money judgments to 
other plaintiffs injured by its Gizmos.  If TortCo or its insurer doesn’t 
pay, the judgment creditors will collect out of TortCo’s assets. 
If TortCo appeals from Victor’s judgment without filing an appeal 
bond, Victor may collect from TortCo’s assets while its appeal is 
pending.  A federal judge will deny TortCo an anti-collection injunction.  
If neither a federal injunction nor an automatic stay in bankruptcy is 
available after the huge jury verdict, the defendant faces the practical 
precondition of posting an appeal bond before seeking appellate review. 
TortCo may have to face the music.  Neither constitutions nor 
statutes say that a tortfeasor corporation can continue to conduct 
business unaffected by large judgments against it.  Even if it were a 
debtor in bankruptcy, TortCo would have to file a plan that comes to 
terms with its creditors.  Many tortfeasor-businesses have suffered the 
consequences of tort judgments and other debts that they cannot pay—
insolvency and dismemberment in or out of bankruptcy.79 
But TortCo maintains that the jury’s huge verdict is vulnerable to 
elimination or reduction on appellate review.  Posting the bond may be a 
barrier to its appeal.80 
 
 78. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 79. Cf. Laycock, supra note 27, at 527. 
 80. An expensive supersedeas bond for an appeal also affects defendant’s ability to appeal an 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
1108 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:1089 
To ameliorate the asperities of appellants’ bond premiums and to 
facilitate appellate review of large judgments, tort reformers placed 
appeal bond caps on their legislative agenda for state legislatures.81 
III.  THE FIRST WAVE 
Part III of this article reveals how the first wave of appeal-bond tort 
reform originated in the “tobacco” states, largely in response to huge 
punitive damages in a jury award in smokers’ litigation in Florida.  In 
this first wave, state legislators in a handful of “tobacco” states set caps 
on the punitive damages component of an appeal bond.  Recall that, 
before this tort reform, a judge would set an appeal bond either (1) by 
starting with a presumption that the appeal bond should equal the 
amount of the plaintiff’s judgment, but with a discretionary authority to 
reduce the bond or change the form of security for good cause; or (2) by 
carrying out the mandatory requirement to set a bond at least equal to the 
amount of the plaintiff’s judgment.  The first wave of appeal-bond tort 
reform provided relief to a judgment debtor by limiting the amount of an 
appeal bond that could be required for the punitive damages part of the 
award. 
A $164 billion appeal bond in a smokers’ class action case, Engle v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco,82 ushered in the first wave of appeal-bond cap 
legislation.  The Engle litigation was only one in a series of tobacco 
litigation cases in which the cracks in the “tobacco wins/smokers lose” 
paradigm of the 1990s became apparent.  As will be illustrated, in a 
number of cases, tobacco began to lose and smokers to win—at least at 
the trial court level.  But those trial court tobacco losses translated into 
huge, sometimes devastating, punitive awards.  The huge punitive 
awards, in turn led to huge appeal bonds. 
A.  The One Hundred and Sixty-Four Billion Dollar Question 
To be specific, several “tobacco” states enacted, in this first wave 
of legislation, appeal-bond-capping statutes in a direct reaction to the 
plaintiffs’ $145 billion punitive damages verdict in 2000 in Engle, which 
 
injunction.  See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment?: A 
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 431 (1999). 
 81. Mike Ballard, 17-Front Tort War, NAT’L L.J., May 12, 2003, at A1.  I hope that a reader 
of my casebook will conclude that my views on tort reform generally are evenhanded with an eye to 
presenting a balanced picture of a complex phenomena.  See RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES, supra note 
65, at 178-216. 
 82. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572, (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Nov. 6, 2000). 
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translated into a $164 billion appeal bond.83  The lawsuits this article 
discusses are, like Engle, The Big Ones—exceptional, high-profile, 
high-stakes, complex, and protracted.  The verdicts and appellate court 
decisions are often large enough to be stock market hits and reported in 
the media. 
B.  Southern Hospitality 
1.  Tobacco Litigation—In the 1990s and Today 
The political economy of tobacco litigation in 2006 differs from the 
late 1990s, the last time I looked.84  The paradigm in the late 1990s was 
“tobacco wins/smokers lose.”85  The tobacco companies defended 
smokers’ lawsuits vigorously.  No smoker-plaintiff had ever collected 
from a tobacco company.  Cracks were visible, but the paradigm was 
still intact. 
In 2006, “smokers lose” is no longer always true.  Large jury 
verdicts for smokers’ and their families have been entered; appellate 
courts have affirmed a few, reduced and reversed others.86  Ms. 
Guardino and Professor Daynard wrote that the tobacco companies have 
paid four smokers verdicts.87 
Some recent highlights of smokers’ litigation will show the shifts in 
smokers’ litigation, as well as the defendants’ scorched-earth litigation 
tactics, including multiple and tortuous appeals.  Many juries have been 
outraged enough at the defendants’ misconduct to return huge punitive 
 
 83. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 2000 WL 33534572, at *32-33 (itemizing damages); Craig 
Timberg, Verdict Leaves Va. Capital Uneasy About the Future of Tobacco, WASH. POST, July 20, 
2000, at B2.  See generally, Finch, supra note 27, at 497-500 (discussing the Engle decision, with 
successive action by state attorneys general and legislative enactments in states including Georgia, 
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia). 
 84. See generally, Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco 
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes? 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999) [hereinafter Rendleman, 
Common Law Restitution]. 
 85. Sara Guardino & Richard Daynard, Punishing Tobacco Industry Misconduct: The Case 
for Exceeding a Single-Digit Ratio Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1, 37-65 (2005).  See John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past 
and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1043-47 (2005), for a short 
summary of tobacco litigation. 
 86. But see Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 110 Ohio St. 3d 5, 12-13 (2006) (reversing 
appellate class certification for a class of consumers alleging that tobacco advertising was 
misleading, on the grounds that the tobacco company was not on notice that its practices could be 
declared deceptive); Price v. Philip Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005), reh’g denied, 846 N.E.2d 597 
(Ill. 2006) (same). 
 87. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 85, at 37 n.284. 
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damages verdicts.  Smokers’ tobacco litigation is, however, far from a 
“smoker-wins” paradigm.  The tobacco companies continue to defend 
each case zealously, including appealing up and down the appellate 
ladder.  These appeals are the stage where this article’s subjects, the 
appeal bond and caps, play their roles, facilitating defendants’ appeals. 
2.  The Importance of Seeing Engle 
As noted at the beginning of Part III, the verdict in the Engle 
litigation led to legislative appeal bond caps in several “tobacco” states.  
In Engle, plaintiffs in a smokers’ class action had received a $145 billion 
punitive award.  The Florida trial judge upheld the jury verdict in 
November 2000.88  In the absence of a Florida appeal-bond cap, the 
tobacco companies would have needed to post a $164 billion Florida 
appeal bond to stay plaintiff’s execution pending their appeal.89  The 
Florida legislature’s amendment to the state appeal-bond provided some 
relief.90 
The defendants were terrified, however, that the Engle plaintiffs 
might collect the $145 billion Florida judgment from their assets in 
Virginia and other tobacco states, courtesy of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  Thus, the move to other 
“tobacco” states to seek similar appeal bond cap relief. 
a.  Virginia 
Virginia, another “tobacco” state soon followed suit.  Virginia is the 
third top tobacco-growing state.  For almost 400 years, Virginia’s rural 
economy has been rooted in tobacco.  The ceiling of the Senate Chamber 
in the state capitol in Richmond is ringed with sculpted wreaths of 
tobacco leaves.  Richmond is the headquarters of Philip Morris, whose 
Richmond factory south of the state capitol produces 700,000,000 
cigarettes each day.  Philip Morris, an Engle defendant, was used to 
having its way in Richmond. 
In 2000, accompanied by an abundance of political hoop-la and 
intense lobbying by Virginia-based Engle defendants, the Virginia 
 
 88. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 2000 WL 33534572, at *31; James Grimaldi, Florida Decision 
Hurts Deal on Tobacco Suites; 2 Firms Offered $8 Billion to Settle Nationwide Claims and Limit 
Jury Verdicts, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2000, at A8. 
 89. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310(b)(1) (amended by 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 00-128); Mark 
Gottlieb & Richard Daynard, Will Big Tobacco Seek Bankruptcy Protection?: A $145 Billion 
Verdict Poses the Question, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 359, 361 (2001). 
 90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.733 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 7, 2006 Gen. Election). 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
2006] APPEAL BOND TORT REFORM 1111 
General Assembly joined Florida and several other “tobacco” states in 
(1) amending their versions of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Acts, (UEFJA); and (2) adding caps to their appeal bond 
statutes.  The proponents’ pitch to the Virginia General Assembly 
focused on the potential catastrophic effect of the $145 billion Engle 
judgment on Philip Morris. 
Labeling the amendments emergency legislation to take effect 
immediately when signed by the governor, Virginia’s General Assembly 
amended and re-enacted the two code sections.91  The Virginia 
legislation capped a defendant-judgment debtor’s appeal bond for a civil 
judgment for non-compensatory (meaning punitive) damages at $25 
million.  The statute included an exception to the cap: an appellant that is 
denuding itself of assets must post a bond in the full amount of the 
judgment.92 
The presumed urgent need to protect those defendants’ assets in 
Virginia and other states by amending the states’ UEFJA will be 
examined below.  That this appeal-bond cap was important enough to 
the Commonwealth to qualify for passage as “emergency” legislation is 
difficult to sustain on any practical or substantive ground.  Hyperbole, 
forceful lobbying, and economic power explained this addition to 
Virginia’s code far better than sound public policy. 
b.  Other Tobacco States 
Four other “tobacco” states’ legislatures passed appeal-bond 
capping statutes.  North Carolina went Virginia’s emergency legislation 
one better.  Governor Hunt called the Tar Heels’ Solons into a special 
session; the legislature passed the cap by votes of 48-2 and 115-1 along 
with a resolution “urging the cigarette giants to purchase more North 
Carolina tobacco as a show of gratitude for the bond cap.”93  The other 
three statutes were virtually identical to Virginia’s.94  Florida’s cap 
differed a little in wording: it referred to “punitive damages” and it 
capped a defendant-appellant’s bond at “$100 million.”95 
 
 91. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.4, 8.01-676.1 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 92. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(J), (K) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sp. Sess. I). 
 93. Eric Dyer and Kerry Hall, N.C. Approves Tobacco Protection Bill North Carolina is the 
Fourth State to Enact a Shield for Tobacco Companies Facing Major Lawsuits, GREENSBORO 
NEWS & RECORD, April 6, 2000, at A1; see also Matthew Eisley and Bob Williams, Shield Tobacco 
Companies Seek May Crumble on Appeal, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, March 28, 2000, at A1. 
 94. See GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-46 (2000), amended by Laws 2004, Art. 778, § 1, and by Laws 
2005, Art. 19, § 5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.187, 426.965 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. 
Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1C-1750, 1C-1760, 1-289 (repealed 2003). 
 95. FLA. ST. ANN. §768.733 (2000).  Finch, supra note 27 (discussing “first wave” statutes). 
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c.  Why Were Legislative Appeal-Bond Caps Deemed 
Necessary? 
Appeal-bond cap legislation mattered to judgment debtors, 
particularly those facing gigantic punitive damage awards, for a number 
of pragmatic reasons, which will be detailed below.  Perhaps less 
obviously, the legislation also aided state governments that were 
receiving payments under the Master Settlement Agreement that had 
resolved previous Medicaid-recovery litigation against tobacco 
defendants. 
A large verdict that never ripens into a collectable judgment 
requires the defendant, as a practical matter, to post an appeal bond for 
its appeal.  While a defendant’s appeals are pending, a capped bond 
gives the judgment debtor time and financial quiescence.  It reduces a 
judgment creditor’s settlement leverage and strategic advantage.  An 
observer may expect a calming effect on the defendant’s stock prices, 
creditors, suppliers, employees, and customers.  The tobacco-states’ 
appeal-bond capping statutes for a punitive damages judgment are the 
first stage of the development in tort reform examined here. 
As an immediate and practical matter, the Florida appeal-bond cap 
relieved the pressure on the Engle defendants in Florida.  Their appeal to 
the Florida district court of appeal proceeded.  In preparing for the 
Florida state direct appeals, three of the Engle defendants agreed to 
make an unconditional payment of more than $700 million to the 
plaintiffs.  These defendants sought to avoid the possibility that the 
plaintiffs’ equal-protection constitutional challenge to the Florida bond-
cap legislation would succeed and that they would be required to post a 
bond.96 
The defendants might have saved their money for more 
precipitation on a future day.  First, the Florida bond cap and the others 
were probably constitutional, as we will discuss below.  Second, the 
Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the Engle jury’s $145 billion 
verdict in May, 2003.  Among other things, that court’s decision 
decertified the plaintiff class.97  The Florida intermediate appellate 
court’s reversal eliminated, for the near future, the original impetus for 
the tobacco states’ first wave of bond-capping legislation.  In December 
of 2006, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed most of the intermediate 
 
 96. Mark Kaufman, Tobacco Firms to Pay $700 Million: Agreement Made to Avoid Posting 
Huge Bond in Fla. Suit, WASH. POST, May 8, 2001, at A1. 
 97. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434, 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), approved in 
part, quashed in part, Engle, 2006 WL 3742610. 
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appellate court’s decision.98  Like the intermediate appellate court’s 
decision, the Florida Supreme Court’s result leaves the plaintiffs with 
little hope of resurrecting that particular smokers’ class action and cause 
of action. 
Even without the Engle jury’s $145 billion punitive damages 
judgment, financial pressures on the tobacco companies from their $10 
billion yearly payout under the MSA settlement with the state attorneys 
general and a rising tide of individual and perhaps class-action products-
liability verdicts may eventually force one or more tobacco companies to 
file for bankruptcy reorganization or liquidation.99 
Indeed, commentators have suggested that state governments’ 
officials supported appeal-bond capping statutes to protect their streams 
of payments from tobacco companies under the Master Settlement 
Agreement, (MSA), the states’ earlier settlements of their attorneys 
generals’ Medicaid-recovery litigation.  A state government’s interest in 
continuing to receive its MSA settlement payout aligned its interest with 
the tobacco companies’ goal of avoiding bankruptcy.100 
Data about the United States’ public-private civil justice system of 
blame and claim is hard to come by.  Litigation takes a long time.  Many 
of the results fly below a professor’s radar; a researcher may never 
discover a private settlement without a lawsuit or a confidential 
settlement of a filed lawsuit.  Many of the jury verdicts that the press 
reports never become judgments because of judicial review and 
settlements.  Social science takes time.  Recent events like the Supreme 
Court’s punitive damages decision in 2003 are not reflected in the 
literature.101 
 
 98. Engle, 2006 WL 3742610.  The complex and divided supreme court decision holds, 
contrary to the plaintiffs, that the trial judge erred by certifying a plaintiff class for punitive 
damages; the Supreme Court decertified the plaintiff class for the third phase of the litigation 
because it centered on legal causation, comparative fault, and damages; the court also held that the 
trial judge erred by deciding plaintiffs’ punitive damages before their compensatory damages; 
finally, the court held that the plaintiffs’ punitive damages were constitutionally excessive.  Id. at 
*8-11, 13.  In parts of its decision, the court also, however, favored the plaintiff side.  For example, 
it approved the jury’s liability findings against the tobacco defendants and held that individual 
smokers’ actions against tobacco defendants would be appropriate, including the benefit of res 
judicata for plaintiff to bar a defendant from relitigating those liability issues.  Id. at *22. 
 99. Gottlieb & Daynard, supra note 89, at 364-65. 
 100. Finch, supra note 27, at 499-500; Gottlieb & Daynard, supra note 89, at 361-62. 
 101. The most recent data in a study of punitive damages published in 2006 was 2001.  See 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the 
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. ST. 263 
(2006). 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
1114 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:1089 
3.  The Price is Wrong 
As important as Engle has been in framing the appeal-bond tort 
reform issue, other “Big Ones” provide continuing support for the tort-
reform effort to facilitate appeals by judgment debtors facing huge 
appeal bonds.  Further, the results of ultimate appeals show that these 
judgment debtors frequently have substantial partial success or even 
complete success before appellate tribunals. 
In the Schwartz litigation in Oregon, the jury verdict for the 
smoker’s estate included $150 million of punitive damages.102  The trial 
judge reduced the punitive damages to $100 million, but the Oregon 
intermediate appellate court reversed for a new trial on the amount of 
punitive damages because the trial judge failed to confine the jury to 
considering defendant’s in-state misconduct.103 
In Bullock v. Philip Morris, the smoker’s family won a jury verdict 
for $650,000 in compensatory damages, plus $28 billion punitive 
damages; the trial judge remitted plaintiffs’ punitive damages to $28 
million.104  The court of appeals held that, despite the 33/1 ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages, $28 million in punitive 
damages was not excessive in light of the defendant’s misconduct and its 
vast “scale and profitability.”105   
In Boeken v. Philip Morris, the jury’s verdict included $3 billion 
punitive damages, which the trial judge remitted to $100 million and the 
court of appeals to $50 million.106  The California Supreme Court 
refused to review, and the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.107 
In Williams v. Philip Morris, the jury thought that the defendant’s 
misconduct warranted $79.5 million punitive damages; the trial judge 
remitted that to $32 million, and the state court of appeals reinstated the 
jury’s $79.5.108  The United States Supreme Court remanded for 
reconsideration in light of State Farm v. Campbell, but the state 
intermediate court of appeals and state Supreme Court persisted in their 
 
 102. Estate of Schwarz v. Philip Morris, Inc., 135 P.3d 409, 414 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
 103. Id. at 439-40. 
 104. Bullock v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); $28 
Billion Award Cut, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 23, 2002, at A6.  See also David Hechler, Billions and Billions: 
Tobacco Takes It on the Chin, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at A1. 
 105. Bullock, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 179. 
 106. Boeken v. Philip Morris, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 645-646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S.Ct. 1567 (2006). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1182 (Or. 2006). 
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decision that $79.5 million was not excessive.109  The defendant filed for 
certiorari on March 30, 2006, and the Supreme Court granted review on 
May 30.110  We will be hearing more about Williams in 2007. 
In addition to the reductions in damages, the tobacco defendants 
have enjoyed some outright success on appeals that are facilitated by the 
appeal-bond cap legislation.  The Georgia Supreme Court, for example, 
held that State participation in the MSA settled an individual smoker’s 
punitive damages.111 
In Illinois in Price v. Philip Morris, the defendant also achieved 
complete success.  In Price v. Philip Morris, a smokers’ class action, the 
trial judge awarded the class $10.1 billion damages, $3 billion of it 
punitive damages.  The judge found that Philip Morris had deceived the 
plaintiffs that “light” and “low tar” cigarettes were safer than “regular” 
ones. 
In March 2003, after the judge ordered Philip Morris USA to pay 
$10.1 billion, the company argued that a $12 billion appeal bond would 
bankrupt it.112  The trial judge reduced the bond to $6.8 billion to 
facilitate the company’s appeal.  In July, 2003, lawyers argued the 
propriety of this reduction before an Illinois intermediate appellate 
court.113  That court nixed the reduced bond.  The Illinois Supreme 
Court, however, reinstated the reduced bond.114 
On Philip Morris’s rare direct appeal, leapfrogging the state’s 
intermediate appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the 
verdict.115  The Supreme Court’s principal opinion, after expressing 
“grave reservations” about the trial judge’s plaintiff-class certification, 
reversed on the merits—the defendant’s use of United States-approved 
terms “light” and “low tar” meant that it had not violated the consumer 
 
 109. Id.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 30, 2006.  Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 126 S.Ct. 2329 (2006).  Professor Hines told us that this was going to happen and why.  
See Laura Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won’t be the Last 
Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779 (2004). 
 110. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 126 S.Ct. 2329 (2006). 
 111. Brown & Williamson v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2006).  However, in Engle v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 2006 WL 3742610, at *7, the Florida Supreme Court, citing the Exxon-Valdez 
litigation, rejected the defendants’ argument that the state of Florida’s MSA-FSA settlement settled 
state smokers’ punitive damages claims. 
 112. Bond Worry Trips Altria, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 10, 2003, at C1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Price v. Philip Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005), reh’g denied, 846 N.E.2d 597 (Ill. 2006) 
(writing the principal decision for the Illinois Supreme Court was Justice Rita Garman, a law school 
classmate of the author). 
 115. Id. 
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fraud and deceptive practices statutes.116 
The developments summarized above set the stage for the further 
codified reforms that followed in the second wave of appeal-bond 
capping legislation. 
IV.  THE SECOND WAVE 
In the second wave of appeal-bond tort reform legislation, the 
appeal-bond cap went national.  This second-wave development 
included (1) the widespread adoption of the appeal bond caps in states 
other than the “tobacco” states; and (2) the expansion of areas of 
coverage under the statutes. 
Between 2000 and 2005, in the second stage of my topic’s 
development, the “general” appeal-bond cap flourished as one of the tort 
reform movement’s agenda items.  The states’ second-wave appeal-bond 
caps, moreover, differ on the type of damages capped, the amount of the 
cap, and the type of defendant protected.  Further, more than half of the 
states’ legislatures enacted appeal bond caps.117  Chalk one up for tort 
 
 116. Id.; Christina Cheddar Berk, Illinois High Court Takes Altria Appeal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
17, 2003, at A23. 
 117. ARK. CODE. ANN.  § 16-55-214(a) (West, Westlaw, through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 85th 
Gen. Assem. and Nov. 2006 Gen. Election); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104558(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-125(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. Assem.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.733(2) (West, Westlaw 
through Nov. 7, 2006 Gen. Election); GA. CODE. ANN. § 5-6-46(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. 
Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-49-5-3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 114th 
Gen. Assem.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 625A.9(2)(b) (West, Westlaw, through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st 
Ex. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6a05(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 411.187(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 39:98.6 (Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. and Reg. Sess. Acts); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.2607(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2006, No. 1-460); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.36(a) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); MISS. R. APP. P. 8(b)(2)(c); MO. ANN. STAT. §§  
512.085(1), 512.099 (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 93d Gen. Assem.); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-1916(1) (Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. 99th Leg.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
20.035(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 73d Reg. Sess., 22d Spec. Sess., and Nov. 2006 Gen. 
Election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(b) (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 102 and J.R. No. 3); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-289(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
28-21-25(1) (LexisNexis through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.09 (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 File 150 of the 126th Gen. Assem.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 990.4(B)(5) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Ex. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19.312 (West, Westlaw 
through 2005 Reg. Sess.); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5701.309(a) (West, Westlaw through Reg. 
Sess. Act 2006-116 and 2005-2006 1st Spec. Sess. Act 1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-26A-26 
(Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess., Sup. Ct. R. 06-72, and 2006 Gen. Election); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-1-124(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. and 2d Reg. Sess.); TEX. R. APP. P. 
24.2(a)(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006( b)  (Vernon, Westlaw through 2006 3d 
Called Sess. of the 79th Leg.); UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(j)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(J) (West, 
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reform. 
The second wave’s genesis appears to have been in model 
legislation proposed by the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC),118 a business-oriented Washington-based organization of state 
legislators and executives. 
The tobacco companies’ difficulties with bonding the Engle verdict 
were generalized to potential products-liability defendants, as well as to 
targets of state and local government suits including lead paint and gun 
manufacturers, indeed to “HMOs, automobiles, chemicals, alcoholic 
beverages, pharmaceuticals, Internet providers, ‘Hollywood,’ video 
game makers, and even the dairy and fast food industries.”119 
Smokers’ tobacco litigation, thus, became an incubator for tort 
reform.  The tobacco states’ first wave of bond caps were a precedent for 
general appeal-bond reform.  ALEC’s model act may have provided a 
starting point for discussion.  Very defendant-oriented, however, the 
model act caps or waives an appeal bond for any judgment above $1 
million or over $100,000 for a local “small” business.120  Further, its 
safety valve only applies when a judgment debtor is “dissipating” assets 
or moving them outside the United States.121 
The second-wave of state appeal-bond cap statutes is too recent to 
have led to much, if any, scholarship.  What characteristics and attributes 
do they have? 
A.  Exception for Defendants Dissipating Assets 
To begin with, like the first-wave of statutes, generally the states’ 
appeal-bond caps do not apply to a judgment debtor that is found to be 
denuding itself of assets pending appeal.  That judgment debtor must 
post a full bond.122 
 
Westlaw through 2006 Spec. Sess. I); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4-11A-4 (West, Westlaw through 2006 
2d Ex. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.07(2m)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 491).  If the 
lawsuit is in federal court in a state that has an appeal-bond cap, the defendant may be able to take 
advantage of the state cap.  FED. R. CIV. P. 62(f).  “In any state in which the judgment is a lien upon 
the property of the judgment debtor,” it is entitled to the same stay in federal as in state court.  Id.  I 
found no precedent on point. 
 118. Mark A. Behrens & Donald J. Kochan, Protecting the Right to Appellate Review in the 
New Era of Civil Actions: A Call for Bonding Fairness, 29 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) No. 
21, at 515 (2001). 
 119. Id. at 516. 
 120. American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”), Appeal Bond Waiver Act, 
http://www.alec.org/2/2/appeal-bond-waiver-act.html. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-55-214(b) (West, Westlaw, through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 
85th Gen. Assem. and Nov. 2006 Gen. Election); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104558(c) 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
1118 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:1089 
B.  Caps Often Not Limited to Punitive Damages 
The first wave’s limitation of the appeal-bond cap to punitive 
damages has dropped out of many second-wave statutes.  For example, 
second-wave Virginia legislation, passed in 2004, caps a judgment 
debtor’s appeal bond for any civil judgment for damages at $25 
million.123  Other caps for all civil money judgments were passed in 
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Michigan, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Wisconsin.124 
Idaho’s appeal-bond cap is $1 million for punitive damages; in 
addition, the court may waive an appeal bond for good cause.125 
Today Mississippi caps the judgment debtor’s appeal bond for 
punitive damages, but the cap is $100 million.126  Kentucky’s $100 
 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-125(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. Assem.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.733(3) (West, Westlaw 
through Nov. 7, 2006 Gen. Election); GA. CODE. ANN. § 5-6-46(f) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. 
Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-49-5-3(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 114th 
Gen. Assem.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 625A.9(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st 
Ex. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.187(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. 
Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:98.6 (Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. and Reg. Sess. Acts); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2607(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2006, No. 1-460); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 550.36(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); MISS. R. APP. P. 8(b)(4); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 512.085(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 93d Gen. Assem.); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-1916(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. 99th Leg.); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§  20.035(2) (West, Westlaw through 2005 73d Reg. Sess., 22d Spec. Sess., and Nov. 2006 Gen. 
Election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(c) (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 102 and J.R. No. 3); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-289(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
28-21-25(2) (LexisNexis through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 990.4(B)(5) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 2d Ex. Sess.); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5701.309(b) (West, Westlaw 
through Reg. Sess. Act 2006-116 and 2005-2006 1st Spec. Sess. Act 1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
15-26A-26 (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess., Sup. Ct. R. 06-72, and 2006 Gen. Election); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 24-1-124(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. and 2d Reg. Sess.); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006( e) (Vernon, Westlaw through 2006 3d Called Sess. of the 79th 
Leg.); UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(j)(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(K) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
Spec. Sess. I); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4-11A-4 (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Ex. Sess.); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 808.07(2m)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 491). 
 123. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(J) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Spec. Sess. I). 
 124. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-55-214(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 85th 
Gen. Assem. and Nov. 2006 Gen. Election); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-125(1) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. Assem.); GA. CODE. ANN. § 5-6-46(b) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2607(1) (West, Westlaw 
through P.A. 2006, No. 1-460); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-26A-26 (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. 
Sess., Sup. Ct. R. 06-72, and 2006 Gen. Election); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-1-124(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. and 2d Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 808.07(2m)(a) (West, Westlaw through 
2005 Act 491). 
 125. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202 (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. 
Sess.). 
 126. MISS. R. APP. P. 8(b)(2)(c). 
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million cap is limited to punitive damages.127 
C.  The Cap Limitation 
The amounts of the second-wave caps vary from Idaho’s $1 
million128 to $150 million.129  The most common cap is $25 million.130  
Other states’ caps are $50 million,131 $75 million,132 and $100 million.133 
D.  Protection of MSA Tobacco Companies 
Several of the second wave appeal bond caps protect the MSA 
tobacco companies.  California’s statute, for example, caps an 
appellant’s appeal bond at $150 million but only for a defendant covered 
by the Master Settlement Agreement, that is a tobacco company that 
 
 127. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.187(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. 
Sess.). 
 128. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. 
Sess.2005). 
 129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104558(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.36(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 130. ARK. CODE. ANN.  § 16-55-214(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 85th 
Gen. Assem. and Nov. 2006 Gen. Election); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-125(1) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. Assem.); GA. CODE. ANN. § 5-6-46(b) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-49-5-3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
2d Reg. Sess. of the 114th Gen. Assem.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6a05(a) (West, Westlaw through 
2005 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2607(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2006, No. 
1-460); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-289(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
28-21-25(1) (LexisNexis through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 990.4(B)(5) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 2d Ex. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-26A-26 (Westlaw through 2006 
Reg. Sess., Sup. Ct. R. 06-72, and 2006 Gen. Election); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)  (Vernon, Westlaw through 2006 3d Called Sess. of the 79th Leg.); 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(j)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(J) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Spec. Sess. 
I). 
 131. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:98.6 (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. and Reg. Sess. 
Acts); MO. ANN. STAT. § 512.085(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 93d Gen. 
Assem.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1916(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. 99th Leg.); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 20.035(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 73d Reg. Sess., 22d Spec. Sess., and 
Nov. 2006 Gen. Election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(b) (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 102 
and J.R. No. 3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.09 (West, Westlaw through 2006 File 150 of the 
126th Gen. Assem.). 
 132. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-1-124(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. and 2d Reg. 
Sess.). 
 133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.733(2) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 7, 2006 Gen. Election); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 625A.9(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.187(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.); MISS. R. 
APP. P. 8(b)(2)(c); MO. ANN. STAT. §  512.085(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 
93d Gen. Assem.); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5701.309(a) (West, Westlaw through Reg. Sess. Act 
2006-116 and 2005-2006 1st Spec. Sess. Act 1); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4-11A-4 (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 2d Ex. Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 808.07(2m)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 491). 
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settled the state attorney general’s Medicaid reimbursement lawsuit in 
1998 in return for making a stream of payments to the state.134  Any 
other California judgment debtor-appellant must bond an appeal at either 
150 or 200 percent of the amount of the judgment.135  Other states’ 
statutes that cap a MSA judgment debtor’s appeal bond were passed in 
Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and 
South Carolina.136 
The Louisiana appeal bonding legislation differs a little; it has two 
provisions: (1) a $50 million cap for a MSA appellant that was found 
liable in civil litigation under any legal theory; and (2) the judge has 
discretion to set a “sufficient” bond for a judgment against any other 
defendant that is over $50 million.137 
E.  Protection of Other “Favored” Defendants 
Other caps shelter only “favored” defendants.  New York’s cap for 
a medical, dental or podiatric malpractice defendant is $1 million or the 
judgment debtor’s insurance policy coverage limit.138 
This second wave of appeal-bond caps, then, witnessed the 
movement of the caps from a handful of “tobacco” states to more than 
half the states.  At the same time, the appeal-bond cap changed in 
amount and nature.  Legislatures varied the amount of the cap, with one 
state enacting a $1 million cap; they often applied the cap to the 
compensatory as well as the punitive part of the award; and they 
sometimes provided additional protections for “favored” defendants. 
V.  IN THE LEGISLATURE 
A tortfeasor like TortCo that a jury has found liable for a multi-
million dollar punitive damages judgment has a hard row to hoe in a 
legislature.  Its status as an out-of-state corporation adds to its woe.  “A 
 
 134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104558(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
 135. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 917.1(b) (West, Westlaw through all 2006 laws and all 
propositions appearing on the Nov. 7, 2006 ballot). 
 136. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6a05(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 512.085(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. of the 93d Gen. Assem.); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 20.035(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 73d Reg. Sess., 22d Spec. Sess., and Nov. 
2006 Gen. Election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(b) (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 102 and 
J.R. No. 3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 990.4(B)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Ex. Sess.); 35 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5701.309(a) (West, Westlaw through Reg. Sess. Act 2006-116 and 2005-
2006 1st Spec. Sess. Act 1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-9-130(B)(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 137. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:98.6 (Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. and Reg. Sess. Acts); LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN art. 2124(B)(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. and Reg. Sess. Acts). 
 138. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5519(g) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2006, ch. 744). 
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state legislature systematically, if not exclusively, favors the interests of 
resident individuals and firms.  On most issues, out-of-state litigants 
have nowhere near the same influence over its deliberations as in-state 
interests.”139  The jury that returned a plaintiff’s verdict for punitive 
damages will usually have found that the defendant’s tort was malicious, 
intentional, or committed with reckless disregard of the consequences.  
Finally the tortfeasor may be a tobacco company, a notorious public 
health menace, for tobacco kills over 400,000 Americans a year. 
The Minnesota Smoke Free Coalition identified the tort reformers’ 
difficulties: 
While these appeal bond limits would make things easier for the 
cigarette companies, there is no evidence that the companies need or 
deserve such special protection. 
“Appeal bond limits are special interest, special protection legislation 
being pushed by tobacco companies,” said Jeremy Hanson, Public 
Policy Director of the Minnesota Smoke-Free Coalition.  “For an 
industry that kills 5,600 Minnesotans each year to ask for special legal 
protections is simply mind-boggling,” added Hanson. 
. . . 
Minnesota companies are not in danger of going bankrupt from large 
appeal bond requirements.  To date, no Minnesota business has gone 
bankrupt under the existing appeals bond law that was passed in 1979.  
“Appeals bond limits are a solution looking for a problem.”140 
Proponents of tort reform are loose coalitions of actual and 
potential tort defendants.  Physicians are more interested in a med-mal 
pain-and-suffering cap than manufacturers and retailers.  The actual and 
potential defendants in Big Ones possess the most concentrated interest 
in appeal-bond reform.  Consumer groups and trial lawyers who 
represent plaintiffs comprise tort reform’s opponents.  Public-health and 
anti-tobacco forces joined the opposition to appeal-bond caps. 
What arguments did tort reformers adduce to convince the states’ 
legislatures to pass appeal-bond capping statutes on behalf of tortfeasors 
like TortCo with huge judgments against them? 
 
 139. George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 347, 365. 
 140. Big Tobacco Cries Wolf with Appeal Bond Cap Legislation, MINNESOTA SMOKE FREE 
COALITION, March 16, 2004, http://www.smokefreecoalition.org/news/press/index.asp?id= 
434&dir=/news/press/. 
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A.  Tort Reformers’ Arguments for Appeal-Bond Caps 
Despite the difficulties facing the out-of-state corporations seeking 
tort reform, their arguments prevailed before many state legislatures.  
This Part discusses these arguments. 
Tort reformers present arguments for appeal-bond caps to a 
rulemaking body to amend a procedural rule.  The petition to the Illinois 
Supreme Court urging an amendment to the state rule is one of the most 
comprehensive statements of the arguments for an appeal-bond cap.141  
Other arguments are adduced to a legislature to amend the state’s 
statutes.142 
1.  Ambivalence about the Role of Juries in Civil Cases 
To begin with, I will make two general points about the tort 
reformers’ foundation for arguments for appeal-bond caps.  Both the 
civil jury and punitive damages are United States species, rare or extinct 
in the rest of the world. 
“No other country routinely uses juries in civil cases.”143  Many 
policymakers in courts and legislatures are ambivalent about the civil 
jury as an institution.  A good example of someone on both sides of the 
issue was former Justice O’Connor dissenting in TXO Production v. 
Alliance Resources.  She wrote that: 
The jury system has long been a guarantor of fairness, a bulwark 
against tyranny, and a source of civic values. . . .  But jurors are not 
infallible guardians of the public good.  . . .  Arbitrariness, caprice, 
passion, bias, and even malice can replace reasoned judgment and law 
as the basis for jury decision making.  Modern judicial systems 
therefore incorporate safeguards against such influences.  . . .  Courts 
long have recognized that jurors may view large corporations with 
great disfavor. . . .  [J]uries may feel privileged to correct perceived 
social ills stemming from unequal wealth distribution by transferring 
money from “wealthy” corporations to comparatively needier 
plaintiffs.144 
 
 141. In Re Proposed Amendment to the Appeal Bond Requirements in Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 305, 2003 WL 22340460 (Ill. May 12, 2003) [hereinafter Illinois Petition]. 
 142. In a jurisdiction with a discretionary bond-amount, see supra notes 40-45, and 
accompanying text, an appellant seeking to reduce or vary security or a bond for good cause may 
argue to a judge against a full-amount appeal bond; this contextual argument is not our subject here. 
 143. AM. LAW INST./UNIDROIT, supra note 12, at 6. 
 144. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473, 474, 490, 491 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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Although the civil jury has constitutional status in the United 
States’ and its states’ courts, the “runaway jury” is a key villain in a tort 
reformer’s rogues’ gallery.  A judge can nip a civil jury on the edges 
under the Reexamination Clause.145  Or the legislature can pass tort 
reform legislation.146 
2.  Ambivalence about Assessment of Punitive Damages 
Second, the argument for common-law punitive damages is a 
precarious one.  Punitive damages, like the civil jury, are firmly 
ensconced in the United States.  The argument that a civil plaintiff’s 
remedies should include the potential to recover punitive damages to 
punish and deter defendants’ outrageous behavior has prevailed in the 
majority of states and the federal system.147  However, the lack of 
legislation defining the potential defendant’s misconduct punishable by 
punitive damages, the absence of criminal procedural protection before 
punishing the defendant with punitive damages, and the “windfall” to 
the plaintiff who recovers punitive damages all militate against universal 
and unqualified public and professional approbation for punitive 
damages. 
The approach courts and legislatures have most frequently taken is 
that punitive damages, while often salutary, may be subject to abuse.  
This potential for abuse leads courts and legislatures to develop 
principles of confinement to assure that punitive damages serve their 
policies of punishment and deterrence.  These limitations include a 
restrictive threshold standard, an enhanced burden of proof, caps on the 
amount, ratios, bifurcation of the trial, and sharing with the 
government.148  “Punitive damages tort reform,” Professor Michael 
Rustad wrote, “is perhaps the most successful legal reform movement in 
 
 145. Cooper Indus., Inc v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436-41 (2001) (holding 
that consistent with the Re-examination Clause, a United States Court of Appeals conducts its 
constitutional due-process review of a district court jury’s punitive damages verdict de novo instead 
of using the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review usually accorded to findings of 
fact). 
 146. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 69 (Neb. 
2003). 
 147. Arguments to abolish common-law punitive damages lost in Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 
1353, 1354 (Me. 1985).  For Professor Gotanda’s careful comparative-law survey showing that 
punitive damages are rare in civil-law nations and limited in common-law nations, see John 
Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391 (2004).   
 148. Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1354; Michael Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1300, 1311-59 (2005) (legislative tort reform of punitive damages). 
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Anglo-American jurisprudence.”149  In the last decade, the Supreme 
Court pursued judicial tort reform of punitive damages by refining a 
major principle of confinement—post-verdict judicial review for 
excessiveness, applying the Gore-Campbell standards.150 
3.  Uncapped Bonds Obsolete in Mass Litigation 
Turning to the tort reformer’s specific arguments for appeal-bond 
caps, to begin with, they argue that full-amount or uncapped appeal-
bond statutes are obsolete in a contemporary litigation landscape that 
includes mass torts, class actions, and massive, indeed astronomical 
verdicts. 
The epoch of the unjust gigantic jury verdict has arrived.  The 
Illinois petition states the tort reformers’ argument in a nutshell, 
“Potentially devastating judgments used to be relatively rare.  . . .  Times 
have changed.”  Perhaps the key change was that “[t]he increasing 
prevalence of class action lawsuits in Illinois compounds the issue.”151  
“Widespread acceptance and application of mass tort and class action 
approaches to litigation, as well as new working relationships between 
private lawyers and state- and local-government officials, have 
contributed heavily to the legal system’s drift from its original 
purposes.”152 
4.  Erroneous Judgments Evade Review 
In particular, certain regions and trial courts are notorious for 
generating exorbitant jury verdicts.  One example, Madison County, 
Illinois was the venue for the Price litigation.  In tort reformers’ 
vernacular, these plaintiff-biased courts are “Judicial Hellholes,” which I 
shorten herein to “Tort Hells.”153 
It is “impossible,” the tort reformer insists, for the huge-judgment 
 
 149. Rustad, supra note 148, at 1359. 
 150. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2002); BMW of N. Am. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). On the Court’s judicial tort reform, see Rustad, supra note 148, at 1360-
67. 
 151. Illinois Petition, supra note 141, at 10-11. 
 152. Glenn G. Lammi & Justin P. Hanke, State Appeal Bond Reforms Protect Defendants’ Due 
Process Rights, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 12, 2004, at 1, 
available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/111204LBLammiSTATE.pdf. 
 153. Steven Hantler, Mark Behrens & Leah Lorber, Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System 
Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1173-76 (2005) (referring to “Judicial Hellholes”); 
see also Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., 2004, http://www.atra.org/reports/ 
hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf (last visited May 30, 2006). 
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defendant to post an appeal bond in the full amount of a titanic verdict.  
William Pryor, then Attorney General of Alabama, maintained that, 
“When governments pursue novel legal theories against entire industries 
for enormous sums of money, there needs to be a fair chance for the 
appellate courts to ensure that the process is fair and the law is 
sound.”154  Appeal bond caps are necessary “so that defendants don’t 
have to go bankrupt merely to pursue an appeal from an adverse trial 
verdict.”155 
To quote from the Illinois petition, “a litigant’s right to appeal from 
an adverse judgment is a bedrock principle in our system of justice.”156  
The combination of a huge plaintiff’s verdict and the defendant’s 
inability to post an appeal bond means that the judgment, although 
perhaps erroneous, will nevertheless evade appellate review.  The 
gigantic-verdict defendant denied an appeal, will be denied due process. 
If the defendant cannot appeal, the Tort Hell trial court’s error will 
not be identified and corrected.  The aberrant trial court will not be 
suppressed.  If the plaintiff’s judgment was erroneous or excessive, that 
mistake will evade review.  The Illinois petition notes that limiting 
meaningful appellate review perpetuates error.  “In over 32% of all civil 
cases, the Illinois Appellate Court reverses some aspect of the trial 
court’s judgment, and the Illinois Supreme Court reverses still more.”157  
Further, “correction and prevention of error . . . are lost if a trial court 
can enter a judgment and require an appeal bond so large as to 
effectively insulate its decision from appellate scrutiny.”158 
The deviant trial court and others like it will continue to enter 
enormous but erroneous verdicts and judgments.  If defendant’s appeal 
is precluded by inability to post an exorbitant appeal bond, an appellate 
court’s ability to correct error and formulate legal standards will be 
frustrated.  Hapless defendants will fry in Tort Hell. 
The tort reformer points to the irony that the unappealable multi-
million dollar plaintiff’s judgment for punitive damages is more 
vulnerable to reversal or reduction than other judgments, particularly 
 
 154. William Pryor, Caesar Sues, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 2001, http://www.fed-soc.org/ 
Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/litigation/caesarlitv3i2.htm. 
 155. Tod Gimbel, Reg’l Dir., State Government Affairs, Altria Corporate Services, Inc., to the 
Rotary Club of Lansing, Changing to Address Society’s Expectations: A Business Imperative (May 
21, 2004), available at http://www.altria.com/media/executive_speech/ 
03_09_02_35_TGimbel05212004.asp. 
 156. Illinois Petition, supra note 141, at 24. 
 157. Id. at 15. 
 158. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
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after the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in State Farm v. Campbell.159  
Although the United States Supreme Court has insisted on intensive 
post-verdict judicial review for excessiveness of a plaintiff’s punitive 
damages judgment, a state’s full-amount appeal bonding requirement 
thwarts this appellate review.  The defendant lacks realistic access to the 
post-verdict judicial review of a punitive damages verdict that the 
constitution mandates. 
5.  Huge Appellate Bonds Create Unfair Negotiating Advantage 
Suppose that the lower-court decision is erroneous or its judgment 
is excessive and likely to be reversed or reduced.  Requiring the 
defendant to post an appeal bond in the full amount of a mammoth 
judgment gives the plaintiff unfair leverage to negotiate an unbalanced 
settlement pending the defendant’s appeal.  The Manhattan Institute for 
Policy Research’s The Seven Myths of Highly Effective Plaintiffs’ 
Lawyers, describes a changing litigation environment, observing that 
“[t]he system coerces defendants to settle . . . by requiring defendants to 
forgo appeals because they cannot afford to post an appeal bond.”160  
The Washington Legal Foundation agrees that “[t]he appeal bond 
requirement, and the accompanying risk of bankruptcy, can be a 
powerful hammer in the hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers when they are 
trying to persuade their litigation quarry to submit and settle.”161  The 
Illinois Supreme Court, amending the state’s appeal-bond rule, 
concurred; it wrote that “the appeal bond requirement may be so onerous 
that it creates an artificial barrier to appeal, forcing a party to settle a 
case or declare bankruptcy.”162 
6.  Encouragement of Bogus Substantive Theories 
In the shadow of a full-amount appeal bond, an unscrupulous 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, knowing that defendant’s appellate correction will be 
thwarted, may foist a marginal or bogus substantive theory off on a dull 
witted, naive, or compliant trial judge down in Tort Hell.  The 
 
 159. See supra notes 59-67, and accompanying text, and notes 148-150, and accompanying 
text. 
 160. Steven B. Hantler, The Seven Myths of Highly Effective Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, CIV. JUST. F. 
(Manhattan Inst. for Pol’y Research, New York, N.Y.), April 2004, at 12, available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjf_42.pdf (citing Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & 
Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present and Future: Solving Old Problems and Dealing With “New 
Style” Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 237, 257 n.102 (2000)). 
 161. Lammi & Hauke, supra note 152, at 2. 
 162. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305, June 5, 2004 cmt., para. (a). 
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Washington Legal Foundation’s, Glenn G. Lammi and Justin P. Hauke 
wrote that: 
when it becomes clear that a defendant will be unable to post a bond 
equal to the extreme damages being sought, the lawyers suing those 
companies have one more incentive to present exotic legal theories, 
utilize prejudicial and inflammatory evidence, and pursue arguments, 
all of which would likely lead to reversal of any judgment on appeal.  
One case supporting this point is Liggett Group v. Engle . . . .163 
Mr. Mark Behrens, a leading tort reform proponent, gave an 
example of defendants settling a plaintiff’s bogus substantive legal 
theory because of a full-amount bonding requirement; his example was 
the tobacco companies’ decisions to settle the states’ attorneys generals’ 
Medicaid reimbursement lawsuits.  “Bonding requirements were a 
driving force behind the massive $246 billion [MSA] settlement.”164  
The Washington Legal Foundation agreed that: 
Full judgment bonding requirements also most likely played a 
significant role in the $246 billion “Master Settlement Agreement” 
reached between state attorneys general and tobacco companies in 
1998.  The risk of having to file bankrupting appeals bonds if they lost 
in court factored into the companies’ decisions not to test the state 
lawsuits’ highly novel legal theories in court.165 
In my study of the Mississippi Medicaid reimbursement lawsuit in 
the runup to the MSA, I concluded that, because the substantive law, 
although murky, did not support the plaintiff, the defendants’ decision to 
settle that lawsuit for several billion dollars was motivated by something 
other than a careful study of the risk of substantive liability.166  Except 
for the Minnesota litigation, which was settled during trial, the Medicaid 
reimbursement lawsuits were settled in separate states at varying pretrial 
stages.  So far as I know, the settling defendants said nothing at the time 
about ominous appeal bonds.  I think it strained, perhaps farfetched, to 
argue that full-amount appeal-bond requirements were the reason the 
tobacco companies settled, though they may have been one factor among 
many others. 
 
 163. Lammi & Hauke, supra note 152, at 3. 
 164. Legislation to Protect the Right to an Appeal: Hearing on S.B 161 Before the Ohio House 
Civil and Commercial Law Comm. 2002 Leg., 124th Sess. (Oh. 2002) (statement of Mark Behrens, 
Esq. of Shook, Hardy & Bacon), available at http://www.alec.org/index.php?id=1113.  See also 
Behrens & Kochan, supra note 118, at 516. 
 165. Lammi & Hauke, supra note 152, at 2. 
 166. Rendleman, Common Law Restitution, supra note 84, at 930. 
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7.  “It Can’t Happen Here”: Presenting the Sympathetic Judgment 
Debtor 
Some judgment debtors are more sympathetic than others.  
Narrative, a simple compelling story of injustice, can play a powerful 
influence in persuading a legislature.  Enter Raymond Loewen, the 
Poster Boy for the appeal-bond cap, a sympathetic face on the tort 
reformer’s claim to legitimacy.167 
Loewen, a Canadian funeral home and insurance chain, had a 
business dispute about three contracts and an exchange with a 
competitor, O’Keefe, a chain in Mississippi.  O’Keefe sued Loewen in 
Mississippi state court.  During a seven-week trial, O’Keeffe’s lawyers 
made, Loewen charged, irrelevant and prejudicial allusions to Loewen’s 
nationality, race, and social class.  The jury eventually awarded O’Keefe 
$500 million damages, $400 million of it punitive damages.  Although 
an appeal-bond cap went into effect later, Mississippi’s full-amount 
appeal bond provision, as applied by the trial judge and the state 
supreme court, required Loewen to post an appeal bond of 125% of the 
verdict, $625 million, to stay O’Keefe’s collection during Loewen’s 
appeal.168  Loewen, thinking that the bond requirement foreclosed his 
right to appeal, knuckled under and settled with O’Keefe for $129 
million.169 
O’Keefe’s lawsuit against Loewen reached a reported decision 
when Loewen instituted a NAFTA proceeding against the United States.  
Loewen charged that what had happened in the Mississippi courts 
violated Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
but he was unsuccessful. 
We usually think that an invasion from Canada would be repulsed 
in the United States’ northernmost tier, for example New York, North 
Dakota, and Montana.  Is a Deep South court and jury the United States’ 
first line of defense against the wily Canadians?  The NAFTA tribunal 
found that the Mississippi plaintiff’s lawyers had made inflammatory 
nationality, race, and class arguments.  Moreover, the jury had not 
understood the judge’s instructions.170  “[T]he conduct of the trial by the 
trial judge was so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice 
amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood in 
 
 167. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 825-826 (2003).  For the Loewen 
story through the settlement, see Harr, supra note 3, at 70. 
 168. Harr, supra note 3, at 70, 93-94. 
 169. Id. at 70, 95. 
 170. Loewen Group, 42 I.L.M. at 825-826. 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
2006] APPEAL BOND TORT REFORM 1129 
international law[,]” the tribunal concluded.171 
In the end, however, the NAFTA tribunal rejected Loewen’s 
contention on the ground that, although serious errors had occurred in 
the Mississippi litigation, Loewen had not exhausted local remedies by 
pursuing his state-court appeal with more assiduity and petitioning to the 
United States Supreme Court.172  In short, if Loewen could have posted 
an appeal bond in a reasonable and civilized amount, the appellate courts 
would have reversed the unfair jury verdict, thereby eliminating 
international embarrassment and improving our relations with our 
Neighbor to the North.  With Loewen’s plight before us, we will return 
to the tort reformers’ arguments for an appeal bond cap. 
8.  Trial Court Discretion to Decrease Bond Amount Insufficient 
But, a skeptic might ask, don’t many appeal-bond statutes and rules 
give the trial judge discretion to set a reduced bond for good cause?173  
The federal or a state’s discretionary appeal bond provision may set the 
full amount of the judgment as merely the presumptive amount of the 
bond, but will entrust the judge with discretion to reduce a bond for good 
cause.   
 Insufficient protection, the tort reformer’s argument continues.  A 
discretionary appeal-bond provision will not protect an enormous-
verdict defendant adequately.  For the very same judge who presided 
over the plaintiff-favoring Tort Hell courtroom will exercise his 
discretion to stick it to the helpless defendant.  The legislature should 
cap the state’s discretionary appeal bond statute because “there is a 
substantial risk that a trial judge who is willing to accept a novel liability 
theory or award an exorbitant judgment against a defendant will be 
unwilling to exercise such discretion in favor of that defendant.”174 
9.  Secondary Consequences to Creditors, Suppliers, and 
Employees 
In addition to undermining the judgment debtor’s financial health, a 
state’s unreformed uncapped bond sends out further ripples of ill 
consequences.  Suppose that a large business corporation will be forced 
into bankruptcy.  Its creditors and suppliers will not be paid.  Its 
 
 171. Id. at 819. 
 172. Id. at 846. 
 173. See supra notes 40-45, and accompanying text, regarding discretionary bonds, and supra 
notes 46-51, and accompanying text, regarding mandatory, full-amount bonds. 
 174. Behrens & Kochan, supra note 118, at 518. 
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employees will be thrown into unemployment.  Its innocent shareholders 
will lose their investments.  The state’s salubrious business climate will 
chill.  The public’s confidence in its judicial system will be eroded.  
Grass will grow in the streets, and not just in Tort Hell. 
Wisconsin’s Governor Doyle insisted that an appeal-bond cap 
would protect local business; “[i]t’s important,” he said, “that we ensure 
that workers’ jobs and pensions are protected while a multi-million or 
billion dollar settlement is on appeal.  [Assembly Bill] 548 will do just 
that.”175 
10.  Protection of MSA Payment Streams 
What supports an appeal-bond cap on behalf of a MSA defendant?  
A few years ago, state governments were the tobacco companies’ 
vigorous adversaries; but under the MSA, they must cultivate a more 
fertile legal environment for tobacco to protect their streams of MSA 
payments.  One of the arguments against the settlements in the attorneys 
generals’ Medicaid reimbursement litigation against the tobacco 
companies was that floating on the stream of payments in the MSA 
converted the state governments into business partners with their former 
adversaries, the tobacco companies.  A skeptic questioned whether “the 
State of New York has an economic interest in the continued financial 
health of an industry that has lied to policymakers for years, violated 
New York laws and deceived millions into a life of addiction and early 
death.”176 
The requirement that Philip Morris post a $12 billion appeal bond 
in Illinois to stay collection in Price led it to express doubt that it would 
be able to meet the $2.6 billion obligation that the MSA called for in 
April 2003.  States that had planned to securitize their streams of MSA 
payments found these plans in doubt, delayed, or abandoned.  The 
Illinois petition insisted that “[t]he inability of a cigarette manufacturer 
to post a multi-billion-dollar appeal bond threatens to force such a 
manufacturer into bankruptcy and disrupt payments to the State under 
the MSA.”177  Thirty-seven state attorneys general joined the Illinois 
 
 175. Press Release, Wisconsin Office of the Governor Jim Doyle, Governor Doyle Signs Two 
Bills Into Law (December 12, 2003), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/ 
journal_media_detail.asp?prid=345. 
 176. John Caher, N.Y. Bill Would Cap Tobacco Suit Appeal Bonds, N.Y. L.J., July 26, 2004, at 
1, available at http://www.tobacco.org/news/171125.html?show_intro=0&records_per_page= 
100&top_only=1 (quoting Blair Horner, legislative director for the New York Public Interest 
Research Group). 
 177. Illinois Petition, supra note 141, at 23 
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petition in the Price litigation to urge a reduced appeal bond.178 
Philip Morris, for its part, is aggressively playing on the states’ 
dependence.  The company is due to pay $2.5 billion to the states by 
April 15 but is warning it may not be able to do so because of the Illinois 
bond order.  Philip Morris is responsible for roughly half of the yearly 
settlement payment to the states.  Its annual payment is usually made 
early, on March 31, but on [the first], the states didn’t get their fix.179 
Tobacco lobbyists reminded legislatures that if MSA signatories 
file bankruptcy, the states’ annual payments are at risk.  “William H. 
Sorrell, the Vermont attorney general, said he has already warned the 
state’s governor and legislators that ‘they might not be getting money 
they have already spent’—$13 million, in Vermont’s case.”180  
“[F]inancial uncertainty due to potentially unbondable judgments in 
Illinois raises substantial questions concerning these cigarette 
manufacturers’ ability to make payments under the MSA.”181 
“Illinois’ outdated and profoundly dysfunctional appeal bond 
requirement is undermining basic defendant’s rights as well as putting at 
risk state revenues that were to come from the tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement . . . .”182  “This issue is particularly relevant for 
state legislators when the defendants are tobacco companies that have 
entered into settlement agreements” with the states because these 
agreements require the tobacco companies to “provide ongoing 
payments to the states.”183 
The Attorney General of Washington reversed her position that 
“[t]he tobacco industry has targeted our kids, withheld safer products 
and deliberately misled the public about the safety of smoking . . . .”184  
Later, however, after the MSA, “[t]he enormous bond ‘could create a 
chilling effect on the ability of the defendant to appeal . . . .’”185  And, 
 
 178. Illinois Petition, supra note 141, at 6. 
 179. Gordon Fairclough & Vanessa O’Connell, Co-Dependents: Once Tobacco Foes, States 
Are Hooked on Settlement Cash – Philip Morris Verdict Sparks Scramble to Shield Firm, WALL ST. 
J., April 2, 2003, at A1. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Illinois Petition, supra note 141, at 19. 
 182. Joseph L. Bast, Heartland Calls for Reform of Illinois appeal Bond Requirement, 
HEARTLAND INST., April 4, 2003, http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=12062.  See also 
Philip Morris USA, Legislation and Regulation, Appeal Bond Cap, http://pmusa.com/en/ 
legislation_regulation/bond_cap_legislation.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
 183. Mike Pfeil, Tobacco Settlement Could Dry Up State, CHIC. DAILY HERALD, March 9, 
2003, at 17 (Pfeil is the Vice President of Communications and Public Affairs for Philip Morris 
USA). 
 184. Fairclough & O’Connell, supra note 179, at A1. 
 185. Id. 
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more importantly, it “could deal a significant, unnecessary financial 
blow to the states.”186 
“Certainly many of us never anticipated that states would become 
addicted to the tobacco money as a way to finance their operations,” said 
Scott Harshbarger, who was attorney general of Massachusetts at the 
time of the settlements.  “It’s a perversion of the intention of the 
litigation, and it’s very unfortunate, both as a matter of public policy and 
a matter of health policy.”187 
The Senate of Pennsylvania Senate Democratic Wrap-up for the 
2004-2004 Legislative Session observed that “[t]he law’s intent is to 
protect the state’s share of the tobacco settlement to ensure that the 
Commonwealth will continue to receive funds in the event that a tobacco 
company that is a party to the Master Settlement Agreement becomes 
involved in litigation that results in a large judgment-verdict.”188 
According to the Price petition in Illinois, “[s]everal States were 
forced to abandon, or at least delay, their plans to securitize future 
tobacco settlement payments.”189  For example, “Virginia’s treasurer . . . 
put on hold $767 million in such bonds.”190  Further, California planned 
“to sell $2 billion of bonds backed by tobacco payments . . . to help 
finance its huge deficit.”191  “New York [planned] to float a hybrid $4.2 
billion bond offering backed by personal-income tax revenues and 
tobacco money.”192  Finally, “Kansas had planned to float $175 million 
in capital-improvement bonds . . . .”193  If tobacco companies declare 
bankruptcy, credit ratings on those bonds could be downgraded, further 
exacerbating state budget problems with higher bond-issuing and 
borrowing costs. 
In Nevada Testimony, tobacco lobbyists from Covington and 
Burling tried to sweeten the deal, stating “there would be a clear 
indication in the market that [an appeal-bond cap] will help the sale of 
those securitized bonds.  It is a direct correlation.”194 
Persuaded by the argument that the Price verdict put MSA income 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. PASenate.com, Senate of Pennsylvania, Senate Democratic Wrap-Up for the 2003-2004 
Legislative Session, http://www.pasenate.com/Weekly%20wrap/OLD_YEAR_WRAP/ 
2003_2004.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
 189. Illinois petition, supra note 141, at 6. 
 190. Fairclough & O’Connell, supra note 179, at A1. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Nevada Testimony, supra note 69. 
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at risk, state government officials reacted to the judgment.  “The 
prospect that Philip Morris USA might not be able to make its annual 
MSA payment on April 15, 2003 prompted 37 state attorneys general 
and the National Conference on State Legislatures to file an amicus brief 
in the Price case urging a lower appeal bond.”195 
11.  No Opposition from Plaintiffs’ Attorneys 
Tort-reform lobbyists pointed out the absence of plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
opposition to appeal-bond caps.  Lobbyists for tobacco companies 
Brown and Williamson, Lollard, and Philip Morris testified in support of 
Nevada Senate Bill 576 that: 
The Trial lawyers essentially, although, they are not supporting the 
bill, withdrew their opposition to it because of the danger to the 
[MSA].  . . .  We had discussions with the trial lawyers, and while it is 
generally not their position to support any limitation like this because 
of the potential impact on the Master Settlement Agreement, they 
“held their nose” and did not testify.196 
Jack Stewart, president of California Manufacturers & Technology 
Association, a group with tobacco company members, stated that the 
appeal-bond cap “never would have happened if the state hadn’t been in 
debt, needing to securitize the tobacco money, . . . I think it would have 
been a very hard sell.”197 
12.  Get on the Bandwagon!  Or “All the Other Kids’ Mothers Let 
Them Post Appeal Bonds Lower Than Their Judgments” 
A list of new appeal-bond caps in other states follows this recurring 
argument.  In the Illinois Petition, “seventeen States have now taken 
steps [to enact appeal bond reform].”  The Illinois Petition added that in 
2000 Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia had modified 
their appeal bond provisions in anticipation of the Engle verdict.  
Further, the Illinois Petition notes that in 2001, Louisiana, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Mississippi enacted appeal bond reforms.  
Finally, after Price, Arkansas, Idaho, and Kansas all enacted reforms.  
The Illinois Petition concluded with an appendix detailing all appeal 
 
 195. Illinois Petition, supra note 141, at 20. 
 196. See Nevada Testimony, supra note 69. 
 197. Vanessa O’Connell, New Laws Help Tobacco Makers with Big Judgments – Amid 
Aggressive Lobbying, Many States Cap How Much Is Set Aside During Appeal, WALL ST. J., July 
19, 2004, at A1. 
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bond reforms then currently instituted.198  “It is also important there are 
seven states, currently, that have passed such legislation and many others 
pending.  I think you are going to see this as a trend throughout the 
country.”199  The trend continued in Utah testimony by a tobacco 
lobbyist, that “thirty states have adopted similar legislation and five 
states have no supersedeas bond requirement.”200 
The snowballing is featured in Altria’s Annual Reports. From 2003: 
“In 2001, only five states had appeal bond caps and five states plus 
Puerto Rico did not require a bond.  As of year-end 2003, 30 states and 
Puerto Rico, representing nearly two thirds of the U.S. population, had 
appeal bond caps in place or did not require one.”201  Then in 2004: 
“Today, including the addition this week of South Carolina, 34 states 
and Puerto Rico, representing more than 75% of the U.S. population, 
have such caps in place or do not require one.”202 
Finally, the North Dakota Farm Bureau’s president Eric 
Aasmundstad, writing the state’s Supreme Court, observed that 
“[f]ortunately, multimillion-dollar verdicts are rare in North Dakota.  
Nonetheless, we should not be the last state in the nation to reform our 
bonding requirements.”203  That’s momentum. 
13.  Assistance from the Legislative Process—Andrews’s Axioms 
Is there something in the legislative process that augments the force 
of the tort reformers’ reason and logic?  While it is difficult to identify 
specifics, I will speculate about the legislative process and tort reform. 
Professor John Leubsdorf’s critique of reformers’ prospects for 
procedural advances was pessimistic.  “Political realities,” he wrote, 
“discourage legislative procedural reform.  The public has little grasp of 
civil procedure and little interest in it.”204  The potential tort defendants 
 
 198. Illinois petition, supra note 141, at 17-18, 32. 
 199. Nevada Testimony, supra note 69 (statement of Alfredo Alfonso, Lobbyist, R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Holdings Inc.). 
 200. Minutes of Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure 
(July 28, 2004), at 3, available at http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/materials/ 
2004-09-22.pdf. 
 201. Letter from Louis C. Camilleri, Chairman of the Bd. and C.E.O., Altria Group Inc., to 
shareholders (Mar. 1, 2004), at 6, available at http://www.altria.com/download/pdf/ 
investors_2003_AnnRpt_Letter_Tribute_section2.pdf. 
 202. Louis Camilleri, Chairman of the Board and CEO, Altria Group, Inc., Remarks at the 
2004 Annual Shareholders Meeting Altria Group, Inc. (April 29, 2004), at 2, 
http://www.altria.com/download/pdf/media_AM2004_ChairmansRemarks_29 Apr04.pdf. 
 203. Dale Wetzel, Cigarette Company Seeking Appeal Bond Cap, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, Aug. 
23, 2004, available at http://www.tobacco.org/news/173794.html. 
 204. John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 613 (1984). 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
2006] APPEAL BOND TORT REFORM 1135 
are repeat players that are likely, in the long run, to achieve most of their 
goals in legislatures.205 
Professor Richard Abel argued for a judicial, as opposed to a 
legislative, role in torts.  Courts deliberate, he insisted, and they “tend to 
be populist . . . .”206  On the other hand, he wrote, special interests 
capture legislatures which are, in addition, “secretive, hasty, and 
unwilling or unable to offer reasons . . . .”207  What allows special 
interests to “capture” a legislature?208  First, the legislators need the 
special interests’ campaign contributions.209  Second, tort victims are not 
organized.210  The legislature, Abel maintains, may subordinate common 
law tort principles, deterrence, loss spreading and moral judgment, to 
tort reform at the behest of organized special interests.  The people who 
lose out in tort reform are, he observes, the people who will be seriously 
injured in the future.211  Legislative mechanisms cannot promise 
legislation that implements majority preferences. 
Andrews’s Axioms flesh out Leubsdorf’s and Abel’s points.  They 
were promulgated by the late Hunter Andrews, a voluble and acerbic 
Virginia state Senator, then Majority Leader, in a private conversation at 
a Democratic Party barbecue in Tidewater.  In retrospect, this reality of 
Virginia legislative government is self-evident, although not susceptible 
to empirical proof or disproof. 
I took the liberty of having the senator’s private ear to reprove the 
General Assembly for passing a statute that disfavored a major 
Democratic constituency—low-income consumers—in favor of banks 
and other, mostly Republican, creditors.212  This travesty had passed the 
Senate unanimously late in the session.  I was nonplused to learn that 
Hunter didn’t remember it.  I explained the legislation, its influential 
patron, and his timing to Hunter and asked what they could have been 
thinking about. 
Talking down only a little to a “perfesser,” Senator Andrews 
explained, forcefully articulating Andrews’s Axioms: The combined 
 
 205. Id. at 613-14. 
 206. Richard Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 533 (1999). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 535-36. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 537. 
 211. Id. at 546-56. 
 212. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (2000) (federal bankruptcy exemption opt-out); Doug 
Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the ‘78 Code, 21 WM.& MARY L.REV. 575, 651-52 
(1980). 
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facts that the bill had a powerful patron and passed unanimously in the 
closing days of the session guaranteed that the senators, individually and 
collectively, were unlikely to have known what they were voting on.  
The bill was technical which assured that the senators wouldn’t have 
understood it if they had known its contents.  The patron’s influence and 
his timing did it. 
State legislative history has historically been hard to discover.  
Today, however, the ubiquitous computer has facilitated that research.  
State legislative journals are available to the assiduous researcher 
through the state governments’ websites; targeted internet searches also 
generate interesting and useful information.213  Some evidence 
vindicates Senator Andrews’s observations in state legislatures’ 
enactment of appeal-bond caps. 
As of July 2006, 33 states have passed appeal-bond cap statutes or 
adopted rules.  Some have passed two bills—for a total of 36 cap bills 
plus three court rules.214  Ten states passed appeal bond bills with 
unanimous votes in both houses, and nine more passed such bills with 
four or fewer negative votes in both houses.215  Of the remaining states, 
 
 213. Here the author thanks two diligent and persevering research assistants Mr. Andrew 
Howard and Mr. Tim Dooley. 
 214. See supra note 117. 
 215. CAL. ASSEM. JOUR., 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., No. 82, at 2149 (June 3, 2003), available at 
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1752); CAL. S. JOUR., 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., No. 115, at 1986-87 (July 27, 2003), available at 
ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/senate-journal/sen-journal-0x-20030727-1971.PDF (same); FLA. H.R. 
JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., No. 33 (May 2, 2003) (Westlaw) (voting on S.B. 2826); FLA. S. JOUR., 
2003 Reg. Sess., No. 17 (Apr. 25, 2003) (Westlaw) (same); FLA. H. JOUR., 2000 Reg. Sess., No. 23 
(Pt. 2) (May 5, 2000) (Westlaw) (concerning CS/H.B. 1721); FLA. S. JOUR., 2000 Reg. Sess., No. 
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(Westlaw) (passing S.B. 411); GA. S. DAILY REP., 2004 Reg. Sess., No. 8 (2004) (Westlaw) (same); 
IND. H. ROLL CALL, 2002 Reg. Sess., H.B. 1204 (Jan. 28, 2002) (Westlaw); IND. B. INFO., Action 
List: House Bill 1204, http://www.in.gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year=2002&request= 
getActions&doctype=HB&docno=1204 (last visited Nov. 21, 2006); KAN. S. JOUR., 2005 Reg. 
Sess., No. 53 (Mar. 25, 2005) (Westlaw) (adopting H.B. 2152); KAN. H.R. JOUR., 2005 Reg. Sess., 
No. 34 (Feb. 25, 2005) (Westlaw) (same); KAN. H.R. JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., No. 52 (Mar. 27, 
2003) (Westlaw) (passing S.B. 64); KAN. S. JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., No. 31 (Feb. 25, 2003) 
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JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., No. 28 (May 21, 2003) (Westlaw) (same); LA. H.R. JOUR., 2001 Reg. Sess., 
No. 48 (June 15, 2001) (Westlaw) (adopting H.B. 1807); LA. S. JOUR., 2001 Reg. Sess., No. 42 
(June 14, 2001) (Westlaw) (same); MICH. S. JOUR., 91st Leg., 2002 Reg. Sess., No. 39 (May 2, 
2002) (Westlaw) (passing H.B. 5151); MICH. H.R. JOUR., 91st Leg., 2002 Reg. Sess., No. 13 (Feb. 
14, 2002) (Westlaw) (same); NEB. LEGIS. JOUR., 2004 Reg. Sess., No. 60 (Apr. 15, 2004) (Westlaw) 
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Illinois, Mississippi, and South Dakota imposed appeal bond reform by 
Supreme Court Rule.216  In Iowa, SF 2306 was assigned to the House 
committee on Rules and Administration, and with six other bills passed 
unanimously.217  In North Carolina’s appeal-bond reform, Senate Bill 2, 
was the second to last enacted bill of the session.218 
In the six states where appeal bond statutes were not approved 
unanimously, appeal bond caps were included in other “tort-reform” 
bills.219  Nebraska’s unicameral legislature passed its appeal bond cap 
48-0 as part of a 35-page bill.220  The appeal-bond portion of the bill was 
initially introduced separately by Senator Quandahl; but it failed to pass 
and was added to the larger bill by committee amendment.221  In 
Arkansas, the bill that included the appeal bond cap was entitled “The 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003” and comprised many “reforms.”222  
The Texas appeal-bond cap was one of several “tort reforms,” including 
limitations on medical liability.223  In California, the cap was added to a 
social services bill just before it was passed, along with many other 
budget-related legislation.  “‘This got done with no public discussion, 
when nobody was looking,’” said Stanton Glantz, a doctor and anti-
 
(same); N.J. ST. LEG., Bills 2002-2003, 210th Leg., S.B. 2738/Assem. B. 3717 (June 30, 2003), 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp; N.C. H.R. Jour., 2003 1st Sess., No. 47 (Apr. 21, 
2003) (Westlaw) (passing S.B. 784); N.C. S. JOUR., 2003 1st Sess., No. 40 (Apr. 8, 2003) (Westlaw) 
(same); N.D. MEASURE ACTIONS, 59th Leg., S.B. 2273 (2005), 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/bill-actions/ba2273.html; OKLA. H.R. JOUR., 2001 Reg. 
Sess., No. 34 (Apr. 2, 2001) (Westlaw) (voting on S.B. 372); OKLA. B. HISTORY, 2001 Reg. Sess., 
S.B. 372 (Apr. 10, 2001) (Westlaw); OR. B. HISTORY, 2003 Reg. Sess., H.B. 2368 (Sept. 24, 2003) 
(Westlaw); PA. B. HISTORY, 2003 Reg. Sess., H.B. 1718 (2003) (Westlaw); PA. H.R. JOUR., 2003 
Reg. Sess., No. 109 (Dec. 22, 2003) (Westlaw) (passing H.B. 1718); PA. S. JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., 
No. 84 (Dec. 18, 2003) (Westlaw) (same); S.C. S. JOUR., 2004 Reg. Sess., Apr. 7, 2004 (Westlaw) 
(adopting H.B. 4823); S.C. H.R. JOUR., 2004 Reg. Sess., Mar. 5, 2004 (Westlaw) (same); TENN. S. 
JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., No. 43 (May 21, 2003) (Westlaw) (voting on S.B. 1687); TENN. H.R. 
JOUR., 2003 Reg. Sess., No. 36 (May 15, 2003) (Westlaw) (same); VA. S. MIN., March 10, 2004, 
(Westlaw) (S.B. 172 and H.B. 430); VA. H.D. MIN., March 4, 2004 (Westlaw) (S.B. 172); VA. H.D. 
MIN., Jan. 29, 2004 (Westlaw) (H.B. 430). 
 216. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(a); MISS. R. APP. P. 8; S.D. SUP. CT. R. 03-13. 
 217. IOWA S. JOUR., 2004 Reg. Sess., Apr. 13, 2004 (Westlaw). 
 218. North Carolina no longer makes its legislative history prior to 2003 available on either 
Westlaw or online. 
 219. H.B. 1346, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2000); H.B. 92, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 
2003); H.B. 393, 93rd Gen Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005); H.B. 2661, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. 
(Okla. 2004); H.B. 4, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); H.B. 1547, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
2000). 
 220. NEB. LEGIS. JOUR., 2004 Reg. Sess., No. 60 (Apr. 15, 2004) (Westlaw); Legis. B. 1207, 
98th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2004). 
 221. NEB. B. STATUS, 2004 Reg. Sess., Legis. B. 1207 (Apr. 28, 2004) (Westlaw). 
 222. H.B. 1038, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003). 
 223. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
1138 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:1089 
smoking advocate.224 
The legislative observer does not need to study “path dependence,” 
order of consideration, or a single-subject prerequisite to understand 
Andrews’s Axioms.  We can add technical procedure to Dean 
Levmore’s list of legislative topics upon which “empirical evidence 
plays a remarkably small role in forming or changing views.”225 
In short, an argument that would not convince a law professor or a 
rules-advisory committee member may prevail in the closing days of a 
legislative session.  The legislature may subordinate reason to power and 
influence. 
B.  Responding to the Tort Reformers’ Arguments 
Opponents of appeal-bond caps replied to the tort reformers’ 
arguments, ultimately unsuccessfully, by emphasizing that, among other 
arguments, (1) there is no general problem that needs to be resolved; (2) 
the gigantic verdicts—the “Big Ones”—are the exception rather than the 
norm; and (3) the solvent debtors at issue can afford most, if not all, of 
the appeal bonds at issue. 
1.  “A Solution in Search of a Problem” 
Bismarck, North Dakota attorney Tim Purdon said that: 
[An appeal-bond cap] is a solution in search of a problem . . . .  We’re 
worried about Philip Morris doing something so heinous that they get 
rendered against them the largest jury verdict in the history of North 
Dakota . . . and in that situation, we’re more concerned about what 
happens to them than the people they’ve injured.226 
2.  Gigantic Punitive Awards as the Exception 
Giant verdicts, tort reformers insist, roast unfortunate defendants in 
Tort Hell.  The facts, opponents respond, do not bear this out.  “[J]uries 
rarely award [punitive] damages, and award them especially rarely in 
products liability and medical malpractice cases.  . . .  When juries do 
award punitive damages, they do so in ways that relate strongly to 
 
 224. Kathleen Pender, State’s Schizophrenic Relations With Tobacco, S.F. CHRON., September 
2, 2003, at B2.  Compare CAL. B. ANALYSIS, S. Floor, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., Assem. B. 1752 (July 
27, 2003) (Westlaw) (adding tobacco securitization to the list of statutory changes), with CAL. B. 
ANALYSIS, S. Floor, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., Assem. B. 1752 (June 23, 2003) (Westlaw). 
 225. Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U.CHI. L. REV. 777, 795 (2005). 
 226. Wetzel, supra note 203 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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compensatory awards.”227 
Many large plaintiffs’ verdicts do not become collectable 
judgments because of the parties’ settlements and post-verdict judicial 
review.  When punitive damages verdicts undergo post-verdict judicial 
review, judges reduce or parties settle almost all jumbo punitive 
damages verdicts.228 
As Professor Michael Rustad summarized: 
There is a giant chasm between sound bites about demonized punitive 
damages gone amuck and the actual patterning of awards.  Empirical 
studies unanimously conclude that high-end punitive damages are 
rarely awarded, are highly correlated with the plaintiff’s injury, are 
reserved for truly egregious circumstances, and are often scaled back 
by trial and appellate judges.229 
The year 2006 is really too early for a legal researcher or a social 
scientist to evaluate the way the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in State 
Farm v. Campbell augmenting post-verdict judicial review will affect 
post-verdict judicial review of huge punitive damages verdicts.230  The 
National Law Journal’s verdict survey for 2005 reported that the total 
awards for the top-100 verdicts “slid for the third straight year.”231  
Moreover, punitive damages are lower, indicating “that jurors apparently 
have scaled back on huge awards intended to punish defendants in the 
cases that end up at trial, but they remain committed to trying to make 
plaintiffs whole.”232 
3.  The Media Features High-End, Titanic Verdicts But Not Their 
Post-Verdict Reductions 
“If it bleeds, it leads,” says the axiom of journalism.  The points in 
the previous paragraphs are obscure from public view because the press, 
even the professional press, reports the newsworthy, the eye-popping 
jury verdict, not the settlements and post-verdict judicial review that 
reduce the size of those verdicts.  For example, a story in The National 
Law Journal discussed a Texas plaintiff’s jury verdict against Merck for 
 
 227. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
 228. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405, 1415-
1419 (2004). 
 229. Rustad, supra note 148, at 1298-99. 
 230. Eisenberg, supra note 101 (explaining data through 2001). 
 231. Leigh Jones, Top 100 Verdicts of 2005: It’s a harder sell: Juries will make the injured 
whole, but big punitives are history, NAT’L L.J., February 20, 2006, at S2. 
 232. Id. 
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Vioxx for $253.4 million; however, the story did not mention that most 
of the verdict, which was for punitive damages, would be capped at 
about 10% of the jury’s verdict under a Texas statute and leave post-
verdict judicial review in both the trial and appellate courts.233 
4.  Solvent Debtors Can Afford Appeal Bonds 
A titanic-verdict defendant will find that posting a full-amount 
bond is impossible, tort reformers maintain.  Some insolvent judgment 
debtors will not be able to post a bond in the full amount of a particular 
judgment to stay collection during their appeals.  This article, however, 
is about the solvent defendant with a chance of reduction or reversal on 
appeal.  For example, in summation in Bullock v. Philip Morris, Philip 
Morris’s lawyer told the jury that Philip Morris “could afford to pay 
punitive damages of a billion dollars or $6.666 billion.”234 
For a solvent defendant, although the tort reformer’s impossibility 
argument may be exaggerated, there are some appeals that the judgment 
debtors probably cannot afford to bond.  For example, both the Engle 
verdict for $145 billion and the Price verdict for $10 billion were 
reversed on the defendants’ appeals.235 
For many large judgments and judgment debtors, however, the 
“impossibility” argument is asserted, but not proved.236  Nowhere among 
the lamentations and gnashing of teeth in the “impossibility” arguments 
that I read did I see an exact figure for what an appeal bond would cost 
an appellant, like the three percent bond premium that I learned during a 
brief telephone call.237 
In Price,238 the circuit court judge required Philip Morris to post a 
$12 billion bond.  The Illinois petition maintained that “Philip Morris 
USA cannot post a bond in this amount, and thus [it] moved for a 
 
 233. Peter Geier, Vioxx Trial: Behind the win: showing jurors Merck’s good side: A Fiery 
Defense Counsel Recounts Her Big Win, NAT’L L.J., November 7, 2005, at 9.  See H.B. 4, 78th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) (capping punitive damages at $25 million). 
 234. Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 235. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing 
$145 billion punitive damages judgment), approved in part, quashed in part, Engle, 2006 WL 
3742610; Price v. Philip Morris, 848 N.E. 2d 1 (Ill. 2005), reh’g denied, 846 N.E.2d 597 (Ill. 
2006).) 
 236. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(expressing doubt that posting a bond will be “impossible”). 
 237. See supra note 53. 
 238. Price. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 942, 946 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003), vacated, Philip 
Morris, Inc. v. Ill. App. Ct., Fifth Dist., No. 96644, 2003 Ill. LEXIS 2625 (Ill. Sept. 16, 2003) 
(reinstating an order setting a modified appeal bond). 
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reduction in the bond.”239  Altria Group’s SEC Form 10-K also took the 
position that “[i]t is not possible for PM USA to post [the $12 billion 
bond in Price] and, absent judicial or legislative relief, PM USA would 
not be able to stay enforcement of the judgment in Illinois.”240 
Matthew Myers, president of the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 
contested the foregoing assertions of “impossibility,” arguing that: 
Altria, which isn’t a defendant in the Illinois case and thus isn’t 
technically liable, could pay the bond for [its subsidiary] Philip Morris.  
Altria has an $8 billion credit line and pays about $5 billion in 
dividends each year.  “Philip Morris wants the court to relieve it of any 
obligation to make any sacrifice . . . .”241 
Professor Linke, an Illinois Economics Professor, commented that 
Altria did have the financial resources necessary to post a $12 billion 
appeal bond for Philip Morris in April 2003.242  Specifically, he noted: 
“The statement of ‘Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows’ . . . [in] 
the Altria 2002 Annual Report makes clear that Altria does have the 
financial capacity to post a $12.0 billion bond in April 2003 without 
limiting its ability to provide needed operating capital to its 
subsidiaries.  Altria spent cash amounts on dividends and repurchases 
of common stock totaling $8.1B in 2000, $8.7B in 2001, and $11.5B in 
2002.  These cash outflows were made after PM USA, a subsidiary of 
Altria, expensed $5.2B in 2000, $5.9B in 2001, and $5.3B in 2002 as 
part of cost of sales for the payments under the State Settlement 
Agreements and to fund the trust for tobacco growers and quota-
holders.  This data make clear that Altria generates sufficient cash flow 
to pay both its State Settlement Agreements and to post a $12B bond in 
April 2003.” 
“It is sufficient to note that $14.6B of Altria’s $15.0B lines of credit 
was not drawn on December 31, 2002.  . . .” 
. . . “While reducing or eliminating dividends and/or share repurchases 
for six to twenty-four months may be unattractive to Altria, such 
actions will not impact the demand for its tobacco and food products, 
 
 239. Illinois petition, supra note 141, at 3 (internal citation omitted). 
 240. Altria Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 16 (March 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.altria.com/investors/02_07_01_secFilingData.asp?showHeader=True&URL=http://ccb.
10kwizard.com/xml/contents.xml?ipage=2078511~repo=tenk. 
 241. Fairclough & O’Connell, supra note 179, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 242. Illinois Finance Professor, Author Finds Altria Group, Inc. Capable of Posting Tobacco 
Appeal Bond; Linke’s Analysis Disputes Tobacco Giant’s Claim of Potential Bankruptcy, PR 
NEWSWIRE, April 1, 2003. 
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and therefore, its cash flow.”243 
Altria responded by pointing again to its SEC filing, previously 
cited, in which it had said that Philip Morris could not post a $12 billion 
bond. 
Michael Bopp, New York state lobbyist for the American Cancer 
Society observed that “[w]e think it’s absurd to regard the tobacco 
companies, some of the wealthiest companies in the world, as unable to 
meet their obligations under the civil justice system . . . .  They spend $8 
billion-plus marketing these products; surely they can find a way to 
finance the civil judgments against them.”244 
5.  Alleged Susceptibility to Bankruptcy May Result from the 
Judgment Debtor’s Other Business Decisions 
A legislature may pass an appeal-bond cap as an anticipatory or 
preventive bankruptcy bailout.245  An insolvent defendant may file a 
liquidation or reorganization bankruptcy, and a large appeal-bond 
premium may create hardship for a solvent defendant like TortCo with a 
shot at reversal.  The tort reformers’ argument that a full-amount appeal 
bond will force huge-verdict defendants into bankruptcy is also asserted 
but not proved.246  A doubter might inquire whether a huge-verdict 
defendant’s alleged “impossibility” leading to its inevitable bankruptcy 
results from its hardship in raising an appeal-bond premium or from its 
business miscues, its tort, TortCo’s defective Gizmo, plus perhaps its 
other torts, and by the other conditions that led to the plaintiff’s large 
judgment. 
6.  The MSA Settlement Agreement was Raised as a Ruse 
West Virginia’s Attorney General Darrell McGraw was skeptical 
because: 
This is a lobbyist bill, an anti-injured citizen bill.  This is a statement 
by the state that the tobacco merchandising is more important than the 
public’s health . . . .  It has nothing to do with the [MSA] settlement we 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. O’Connell, supra note 197, at A1. 
 245. In passing the September 11 legislation to compensate victims, Congress was concerned 
about saving the airlines from being forced into insolvency by victims’ families’ wrongful-death 
lawsuits, settlements, and judgments.  Robert Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans 
Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699, 712 (2005). 
 246. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (expressing doubts about the bankruptcy argument). 
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entered into . . . .  That is only a ruse to get a cap on the bond.  If the 
idea is that they want to protect the state’s revenue, then they ought to 
require that (the tobacco industry) post a $1.8 billion bond and allow 
the judicial system to work . . . .247 
C.  Arguments Not Fully Aired in the State Legislatures May Be the 
Most Persuasive 
Some critics, in the public health community and elsewhere, are 
indifferent to a tobacco-company defendant’s contentions that it will be 
impossible for it to post a full-amount bond and that it will be forced 
into bankruptcy.  A court’s usual approach is that “[t]he punitive 
damages award should sting, but ordinarily it should not destroy.”248  A 
court cannot sentence a corporate criminal to jail; it can only punish a 
corporate malefactor by taking its money.  If a court imposes punitive 
damages to punish corporate misconduct, then why not “destroy” a 
corporation for unforgivable misconduct?  These critics argue that the 
tobacco companies are death-dealing monsters who should be extirpated 
forthwith.  One way to exterminate the varmints is to use punitive 
damages judgments as capital punishment.249 
This observer, and perhaps the critics, would prefer, however, for 
an appellate court to stamp the imprimatur of correctness on a jury’s 
punitive damages death sentence before loading the corporate defendant 
on the tumbrel.  Even a believer in punitive damages for capital 
punishment may conclude that the generalized due process argument for 
an appeal that I develop below is compelling.  Militating against punitive 
damages as capital punishment is the post-verdict judicial review the 
Supreme Court mandated in Gore and Campbell.250  Moreover, some 
defendants who must deal with jumbo judgments have beneficial 
attributes aside from the tort or breach of contract that led to a discrete 
judgment. 
Not all arguments were fully vetted before the state legislatures.  
 
 247. Tobacco Litigation: House Passes, then Recalls Bill to Cap Appeal Bonds, Class Action 
Reporter (Bankruptcy Creditors’ Service, Inc., Princeton, N.J., and Beard Group, Inc., Wash., D.C.), 
April 16, 2001, available at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010416.MBX (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 248. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So.2d 685, 697 (Ala. 1996), (quoting Davis Carr, 
Punitive Damages and Post-Verdict Procedures: Where Are We Now and Where Do We Go From 
Here?, ALA. LAWYER, Mar. 1990, at 94-95), vacated, 519 U.S. 923 (1996). 
 249. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 85; Cynthia Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturer of This 
Product May Have Engaged in Cover-Ups, Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case for Limitless 
Punitive Awards in Products Liability Lawsuits, 73 IND. L.J. 187, 224-26 (1997). 
 250. Fairclough & O’Connell, supra note 179. 
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Here, I discuss, first, the judgment-debtor’s right to obtain restitution if 
the judgment debtor appeals without a bond, the plaintiff collects on the 
judgment during appeal, and the court thereafter concludes that the 
jury’s verdict was improper.  I explore, second, what I refer to as the 
judgment debtor’s “lower case” due process right to appeal. 
1.  Judgment Debtor’s Right to Restitution for Improperly Collect 
Judgment 
One point, clearly enough established to warrant a restatement 
section, is absent from the tort reformers’ arguments to cap appeal 
bonds: A judgment debtor may appeal a judgment without posting bond, 
risk the judgment creditor’s collection, and if the appellate court reverses 
the judgment, recover restitution.251  The defendant’s right to recover 
restitution for an improperly collected judgment should dampen a 
plaintiff’s ardor to collect while the defendant’s appeal is pending. 
Even so, a zealous smoker-plaintiff started collection while a 
punitive damages judgment against a tobacco company was on appeal.  
In Bullock v. Philip Morris, the trial judge had remitted the smoker’s 
family’s jury verdict for $28 billion punitive damages, to $28 million.  
Plaintiff filed judgment liens in three states.  The court of appeals stayed 
plaintiff’s enforcement and approved the parties’ stipulation of treasury 
bills instead of a bond for a stay.  The trial judge sanctioned plaintiff’s 
lawyer for not withdrawing the judgment liens, but the court of appeals 
reversed the sanction because there was no sanctioning rule in effect 
then.252 
Nevertheless, although it should not be excluded from 
consideration, I am not confident, in the final analysis, what weight to 
give the plaintiff’s right, in the absence of an appellant’s bond, to collect 
and the ultimately successful appellant’s right to restitution.  If, pending 
a defendant’s unbonded appeal, a judgment creditor filed the judgment 
for a lien on the defendant’s headquarters and factories, ordered the 
sheriff to levy a writ of execution or Fieri Facias on the art and furniture 
at defendant’s corporate headquarters, or garnished its bank account, 
then that collection activity would be likely to disrupt a corporation’s 
credit and other business relationships and perhaps the publicity would 
 
 251. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 252. Bullock v. Philip Morris, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  Other collection during 
an appeal includes New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
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affect the market value of its stock.253 
2.  Denial of “Lower Case” Due Process Right to Appeal 
Without a bond cap, tort reformers argue, defendants will be denied 
an appeal and due process. 
The first response is the preceding point: A judgment debtor that 
cannot or does not file an appeal bond will not lose its right to appeal, 
although it will lose its ability to avoid the judgment creditor’s collection 
techniques. 
A second response is that although the tort reformers’ assert that 
posting an appeal bond is impossible and that defendants will be forced 
into bankruptcy, they have not sustained these arguments conclusively. 
The third response is that a defendant’s due process “right” to an 
appeal is an illusive argument.  Due process is a protean concept that 
takes different forms in different contexts.  United States constitutional 
due process in a civil matter requires that a defendant receive notice and 
an opportunity to be heard by the decisionmaker.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause due process is also the foundation for 
state court personal jurisdiction254 and for the punitive damages review 
that we have examined.255  Some of what we do know about civil 
constitutional due process is murky, based on dicta.  Beyond those 
minimum requirements and murkiness, we do not know much about 
civil due process—except from Professor John Leubsdorf’s article.256  In 
that article, however, Professor Leubsdorf was concerned about the 
economic underdog, not TortCo the manufacturer of the injury-dealing 
Gizmo, our giant corporate apparent tortfeasor. 
The Price petition in Illinois, in fact, argued for a state 
constitutional due process right to appeal.257 
 
 253. Harr, supra note 3, at 70, 95. 
 254. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 255. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2002); BMW of N. Am. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 256. Leubsdorf, supra note 204. 
 257. Illinois petition, supra note 141, at 15-16.  Constitutions establish the government’s 
framework and institutions, including its courts, but I do not find them to create an individual’s due 
process right to a civil appeal.  Litigants have attacked fees and costs that burden their access to 
courts under equal-protection and open-courts provisions.  JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 6.07[1] (4th 
ed., Michie 2006).  The West Virginia Supreme Court found that a taxpayer’s bond for an appeal 
from the tax commission to the trial court violated the state constitution’s open-court provision 
because the Tax Commissioner, the taxpayer’s adversary, had unchecked discretion to waive the 
bond or set a substitute; the Supreme Court granted the trial judge power to review the 
administrative decision.  Frantz v. Palmer, 564 S.E.2d 398 (2001). 
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This article adds another layer to constitutional due process.  It 
argues that the judgment debtor’s “lower-case due-process” rights are 
jeopardized in the absence of judicial review.  By “lower-case due-
process,” this article means a due-process concept comprising universal 
norms of fair procedure discrete from the minimum guarantees in the 
United States Constitution.  Someone who invokes lower-case due 
process invokes those universal procedural norms.  By reviewing the 
spotty constitutional protection provided by the Fourteenth Amendment 
for a trial loser’s appeal we will learn why we need lower-case due 
process as a supporting and ancillary concept. 
First, a state’s full-amount appeal bond provision appears to be 
constitutional.  To protect the successful plaintiff-judgment creditor and 
to facilitate her ability to collect, a state statute or rule may require a 
judgment debtor-appellant to secure the appeal.258 
Second, a losing defendant in a civil lawsuit lacks a United States 
Constitutional Due-Process Clause right to appeal without posting a 
required full-amount bond.  Indeed, a civil defendant appears to lack a 
federal constitutional due process right to appeal at all.  “This Court,” 
wrote Justice White for the Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normet, “has 
recognized that if a full and fair trial on the merits is provided, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to 
provide appellate review.”259 
Although perhaps not a component of Fourteenth Amendment “due 
process,” an appeal is, however, a basic component of our idea of a fair 
and accurate decisionmaking system.  The losing litigant’s lack of a 
 
 258. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972); Hampshire Vill. Assocs. v. Dist. Court, 408 
N.E.2d 830, 833 (Mass. 1980). 
 259. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 77 (dicta); Bell v. Marinko, 235 F. Supp. 2d 772, 779 (N.D. Ohio 
2002); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 
12.7, at 760 (5th ed. 2001); Laycock, supra note 27, at 509; Carlson, supra note 27, at 31.  A 
convicted criminal defendant has no constitutional due-process right to an appeal either.  Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).  The criminal defendant’s constitutional right in a criminal appeal 
also falls under the Equal Protection Clause; that Clause forbids official invidious discrimination 
against an impecunious litigant.  Id.  A criminal defendant’s equal-protection rights during an 
appeal are “stronger” than a civil defendant’s.  For example, under the doctrine of abatement ab 
initio, if a criminal defendant who is appealing from his conviction dies before the appellate court 
decides his direct appeal, the criminal prosecution is not merely abated, it is expunged.  
Commonwealth v. De La Zerda, 619 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Mass. 1993) (declining to abate deceased 
defendant’s collateral appeal).  The expungement includes any unpaid compensatory criminal 
“restitution.”  United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 2004).  The reason 
courts give to abate a defendant-decedent’s conviction is that appellate review is crucial to the 
integrity of criminal justice; if the defendant is unable to secure review on appeal, the jury’s guilty 
verdict is nullified.  The government may start over - in a civil lawsuit against the decedent’s estate, 
without the benefit of preclusion from the “expunged” criminal trial.  Id. 
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federal constitutional right to an appeal is a paradox, for “[a] right of 
appeal is a generally recognized procedural norm.”260  A trial loser’s 
appeal is a crucial principle of containment on concentrated power.  It 
divides power vertically to prevent the trial judge from laying down an 
arbitrary decision; and it protects the public values of order, stability, 
and fidelity to the principle of stare decisis.261  Although the trial loser’s 
right to appeal lacks United States Constitutional status, such a 
fundamental right comports with our understanding of what I am calling 
lower-case due process. 
Third, even though a losing civil litigant lacks a federal due process 
right to an appeal, the legislature may not build an appellate system on a 
foundation of arbitrary, invidious distinctions.262  Indeed, in Lindsey v. 
Normet, a tenant’s appeal from a landlord’s Forcible Entry and Detainer 
eviction of the allegedly undesirable or nonpaying defendant-tenant, the 
Supreme Court found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause rather 
than a Due Process Clause right to appeal.  Although the state had a 
prerequisite that the tenant post a double bond for appeal, it required 
only a single bond for other appellants.  The Supreme Court held that 
requiring a double bond only for a tenant’s eviction violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.263  The tenant’s double bond was a classification that 
created hardship for an impoverished tenant-appellant and perhaps 
precluded his appeal. 
Fourth, Professor Leubsdorf argued for a broader right to appeal.  
He maintained that, “It is difficult to imagine a civilized system of 
justice without appeals . . . because appellate review is essential to the 
consistent and accurate application of the law.”264  Concerned about 
procedural barriers that prejudiced an indigent litigant—not a Fortune 
 
 260. AM. LAW INST./UNIDROIT, supra note 12, at 151.  The basic nature of an appeal came 
up in 2006 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).  The Supreme Court held that a military 
commission to try an enemy combatant violated United States law and the Geneva Convention 
because justice recognized by civilized people required a “regularly constituted court affording all 
the judicial guarantees.”  Id. at 2795.  The Convention’s Common Article 3, which does not define 
what comprises a “regularly constituted court,” left to the Court to infer the content from 
Convention commentary and customary international law; the Court held that it includes ordinary 
military courts, courts-martial.  Id.  Justice Kennedy, concurring, added that, because the military 
commission’s “review panel” is not a proper appeal that would protect the combatant’s fundamental 
rights, the commission lacked an important safeguard to assure accuracy and legitimacy.  Id. at 2807 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 261. D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate Review and Stare 
Decisis, 45 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 6 (Spring 2006). 
 262. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (appeal inequalities may violate equal 
protection). 
 263. Id. at 79 (double security does violate equal protection). 
 264. Leubsdorf, supra note 204, at 628. 
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500 tortfeasor corporation—he referred to economic barriers to justice 
like filing fees, as well as to the lack of legal services to the poor and 
one-way attorney-fee shifting.  A “right to appeal,” he argued, “would 
furnish a strong basis for decisions striking down financial barriers to 
appeals.”265  And he emphasized the appellant’s constitutional rights.  
Referring to free speech, he wrote that “[a] defendant should . . . be 
guaranteed immediate recourse [to an appellate court] when the trial 
judge prohibits the exercise of what he claims are his constitutional 
rights.”266  Professor Leubsdorf’s cogent remarks fail, however, to 
provide much direct support to a corporate TortCo that is encountering a 
financial barrier to an appeal because it will have trouble bonding 
Victor’s $250 million judgment. 
Fifth, direct holdings bearing on a trial court loser’s constitutional 
right to appeal are scarce because legislatures have guaranteed a civil 
trial loser’s appeal adequately and so securely that the appeal has not 
needed constitutional reinforcement.  “Each of the fifty states (as well as 
the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) 
maintains one or more appellate courts as part of its own independent 
judicial system, structured like a pyramid.”267  The trial court loser, of 
course, must hew sedulously to the applicable rules statutes and court 
rules. 
Beyond that, we turn to lower-case due process, policy arguments 
separate from constitutional law.  A corporate judgment debtor like 
TortCo may be too “poor” to post the mandatory bond that guarantees 
that the plaintiff will be paid.  TortCo may argue that a mandatory full-
amount bond denies it a day in the appeals court and violates due 
process or equal protection.  That defendant’s argument is really more 
for lower-case due process, that is for “fairness,” than for 
“unconstitutionality.”  The tort reformer’s due-process argument for a 
capped-bond appeal is more attractive on lower-case due process or 
fairness grounds than on constitutional grounds.  In other words, a tort 
reformer can argue more persuasively for a capped or limited bond to a 
rules committee or to a legislature than to a court.268 
Appeals have two functions in our court system: first, the appellate 
 
 265. Id. at 630. 
 266. Id. 
 267. DANIEL MEADOR, THOMAS BAKER & JOAN STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS: 
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 2 (2d ed. 2006). 
 268. See also United States v. Krass, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (holding that an indigent filing 
for bankruptcy must pay filing fees); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (explaining that 
the state must waive filing fees for an indigent suing for divorce, because the state has a monopoly 
on granting a divorce). 
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court examines the lower court’s decision for error, it reviews for 
correctness and, second, it develops, refines, and articulates the general 
principles that undergird our public values, it creates and maintains the 
common law.  In the first instance, an appellate court’s correctness 
review “assures litigants that the decision in their case is not prey to the 
failings of whatever mortal happened to render it, but bears the 
institutional imprimatur and approval of the whole social order as 
represented by its legal system.”269  Second, a common-law legal system 
requires appellate courts “to announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules 
of decision employed by the legal system in which they serve.”270 
The tort reformers’ arguments for an appeal-bond cap invoke both 
these functions.  If want of an appeal bond thwarts a defendant’s appeal, 
that will perpetuate error and create unfairness.  Witness Loewen.271  The 
importance of an appeal to the reality and to our perception of justice 
done i.e., in lower-case due process, combines with the Supreme Court’s 
augmented post-verdict judicial review of a plaintiff’s punitive damages 
verdict272 to comprise the strongest argument for an appeal-bond cap. 
D.  Is Appeal-Bond Cap Legislation for Big Business Appropriate? 
The tort reformers had some obstacles to overcome.  They represent 
big business, usually out-of-state corporations, a small group of a large-
scale tortfeasors.  Harry and Harriet Homeowner cannot identify with 
tort-reform proponents and say “TortCo could be denied review of its 
$250 million punitive damages judgment and that just isn’t fair.  That 
could be us.” 
The tort reformers exploited the natural advantages of big business 
with a continuing interest in obviating a problem.  Their arguments shift 
attention away from the defendant’s tort, its misconduct.  They focus on 
individual stories of hardship like that in the Loewen case.  They tell a 
story of discrimination, potential hardship.  Bad things happen to 
innocent businesses down in Tort Hell because of greedy trial lawyers, 
bent judges, and stampeded juries.  This problem has the potential to 
 
 269. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBURG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 
2 (1976). 
 270. Id. at 3.  The authors strained to find a constitutional home base for an appeal, stating, 
“[t]rue, the constitutional status of the right to appeal is itself without express support; yet, within 
many, if not all, the imperatives we shall identify we discern elements of the constitutional concept 
of due process of law.” Id. at 7. 
 271. See supra notes 167-172, and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 59-67, and accompanying text, and notes 148-150, and accompanying 
text. 
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bankrupt a large employer and to affect the whole state.273 
My own conclusions about the balance between the proponents and 
the opponents of appeal-bond caps are mixed.  Many of the tort 
reformers’ arguments are shopworn tort-reform rhetoric, ipse dixit, true 
only if believed.  However, even though we cannot be positive that it 
will be “impossible” for TortCo to post a full-amount appeal bond and 
that, absent the amelioration of a cap, its “bankruptcy” will be imminent, 
a modicum of sympathy is appropriate.  For a trial loser’s appeal is a 
crucial component of lower-case due process that policymakers should 
foster and strive to protect. 
Let’s follow the bond-capping statutes from the legislatures to the 
courts where other tort-reform measures have been tested and some 
found unconstitutional. 
VI.  IN THE COURT 
We now turn from the arguments addressed to the legislatures 
regarding the merits of enacting appeal-bond cap legislation to whether 
that legislation, once enacted, can survive judicial scrutiny.  In this 
section, I address whether judgment creditors will be successful in 
arguing to the courts that appeal-bond capping legislation is 
unconstitutional.  Judgment creditors have three primary bases for 
attacking the statutes or rules: (1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
precludes a collection state, not the state in which the judgment was 
entered, from applying the collection state’s appeal bond cap when the 
judgment creditor attempts to enforce the judgment; (2) the federal 
constitution’s due process and equal protection clauses may invalidate 
the bond-capping legislation; and (3) state constitutional provisions, 
separate and apart from arguments under the federal constitution, may be 
used to invalidate the appeal-bond caps.  As I detail within, appeal-bond 
cap legislation will survive challenges based on the federal constitution 
in virtually every instance.  Further, some state constitution provisions 
provide a more fertile basis for attacking appeal-bond caps, but even 
these arguments will probably yield limited success. 
To start with the defendant-appellant-judgment debtor’s side, 
although an appeal bond puts a price on an appellant’s quest for 
 
 273. Rustad, supra note 148, at 1298-99.  See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to 
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, 
Change, and the Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 71; 
Michael Rustad, The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of Punitive Damages: Unraveling Punitive 
Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 15. 
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appellate justice, if a state has a full-amount appeal bond provision, a 
judgment debtor appears to lack a constitutional right to a reduced 
bond.274 
As discussed in Parts III-V of this article, although the constitution 
does not compel a state to cap its appeal bond, many legislatures have 
done so.  Viewing a cap from the plaintiff-judgment creditor’s 
perspective, an appeal bond in a lower amount than the judgment has 
two consequences.  First, it reduces the judgment creditor’s economic 
settlement leverage on the judgment debtor.  The objective observer will 
not deplore this diminution.  Second, it creates somewhat more of a risk 
than a full-amount bond that a judgment creditor will not be paid.  At 
this writing, we have no evidence that appeal-bond caps have resulted in 
nonpayment of judgments. 
With these issues in mind, I turn to the final major undertaking of 
this article: analyzing whether a state’s appeal-bond cap is 
unconstitutional.  The state’s bond cap is, as I will examine below, 
probably constitutional.  In reaching this conclusion, I explore the 
following issues: (A) the technical and difficult issues regarding the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause; (B) due process and equal protection arguments 
under the federal constitution; and (C) arguments available under state 
constitutions. 
A.  Federal Full Faith and Credit 
Several lawyers and law professors said that the tobacco states’ first 
wave of appeal-bond caps violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause or 
were otherwise unconstitutional in unspecified ways.275  They were 
wrong.  Examining this subject will take more ink than due process and 
equal protection below because full faith and credit is a complex and 
 
 274. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Stewart, 241 
U.S. 261, 263 (1916); Hampshire Vill. Assocs. v. Dist. Court, 408 N.E.2d 830, 833 (Mass. 1980).  
In Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, the federal court of appeals affirmed a federal 
preliminary injunction that barred state-court plaintiffs from enforcing a state injunction and 
collecting the accompanying damages judgment from the federal plaintiffs who were civil rights 
organizations and active members.  595 F.2d 291, 294, 309 (5th Cir. 1979).  The court hinged the 
Henry decision on the federal plaintiffs’ free speech rights, not on due process.  Id. at 302-05.  
Moreover, as I noted earlier, Henry was a civil-rights era decision that would probably not be 
decided the same way today.  See supra note 72.  But see, Professor Elaine Carlson maintaining that 
a judgment debtor could have a right to an unbonded or limited-bond appeal under a state 
constitutional provision providing for “open courts.”  Carlson, supra note 27, at 43-49.  Professor 
Laycock commented on Professor Carlson’s suggestion by observing that the Texas open-court 
provision resembles due process.  Laycock, supra note 27, at 523-24. 
 275. Finch, supra note 27, 504-05 (quoting several). 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
1152 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:1089 
arcane subject. 
As detailed in Part III of this article, Virginia’s legislature and other 
“tobacco” states’ legislatures passed the first wave of bond caps after the 
Florida jury’s verdict for $145 billion in Engle.  The legislatures’ 
purpose was to protect the Engle defendants’ assets in their respective 
states.  In Florida, the capped appeal bond facilitated the defendants’ 
direct appellate review of the judgment which was eventually 
successful.276 
In Virginia and the other first-wave states, the legislatures’ chief 
goal was to protect Engle defendants’ assets in their states after 
defendants’ direct review in the Florida system was exhausted, that is 
during the Florida judgment creditors’ actions in their respective states 
to collect the Florida judgment from the defendant’s local assets.  At this 
writing several years later, the Engle judgment has just been resolved in 
defendants’ favor on direct appeal in Florida.  So the legislatures’ haste 
to pass the first-wave appeal bond caps and to amend their foreign-
judgments statutes turned out to have been an unnecessary precaution. 
Even though the Florida courts reversed the Engle verdict, the 
specter of huge punitive damages verdicts continues to haunt the tobacco 
companies.277  Modifying Victor v. TortCo slightly produces a scenario 
in which an Engle-type verdict is affirmed.  Suppose Victor’s $250 
million judgment against TortCo survives post-verdict judicial review in 
Florida, the judgment-rendering state.  Suppose further that Victor, a 
plaintiff-judgment creditor, has prevailed in Florida on TortCo’s direct 
appeal and the United States Supreme Court has declined review.  
TortCo’s corporate headquarters are in the sister state of Virginia, and 
TortCo has other assets there.  Victor, the judgment creditor, now seeks 
to collect from the judgment debtor’s assets in Virginia, a state with a 
bond cap.  In other words, Victor will be collecting her $250 million 
Florida punitive damages judgment from TortCo’s assets in Virginia. 
What Full Faith and Credit Clause issues grow out of the 
application of Virginia’s bond cap when a sister-state judgment creditor 
seeks to collect her Florida judgment from the judgment debtor’s 
domestic Virginia assets?278  The example presents a Florida state court 
judgment with collection on the judgment to proceed in a Virginia state 
court.  Two other possibilities for a Florida judgment creditor are: (1) 
 
 276. See Engle, 2006 WL 3742610, at *22. 
 277. See supra notes 84-90 and 97-98, and accompanying text, and infra note 351, and 
accompanying text. 
 278. WILLIAM REYNOLDS & WILLIAM RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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Victor could file a Florida state court judgment in Virginia federal 
court;279 or (2) Victor could file a Florida United States District Court 
judgment in Virginia federal district court.280  The analysis does not 
vary. 
1.  Procedure for Collecting on a Judgment in a Sister State 
Let’s trace the procedure beginning with Victor’s verdict in Florida 
state court and ending with Victor’s attempt to collect from TortCo’s 
assets located at its corporate headquarters in Virginia.  After the Florida 
jury’s $250 million verdict, the litigants’ most important stay and appeal 
activity will occur in the judgment-rendering state, Florida.  A Florida 
money judgment that is not final there because it is undergoing direct 
review in the trial court or is subject to appeal or being reviewed on 
appeal is not entitled to full faith and credit in Virginia.281  Under full-
faith-and-credit doctrine, Florida law governing stays and appeals 
determines the effect the judgment will eventually have in Virginia.282 
Moreover, according to Virginia’s appeal-bond statute, a judgment 
creditor like Victor cannot collect a Florida damages judgment in 
Virginia if the judgment creditor has appealed in Florida and furnished 
the security that state’s law requires.283  Virginia’s bond-capping 
legislation will come into play if, after the Florida jury’s verdict, the 
Florida trial judge, both the Florida appellate courts, and perhaps the 
United States Supreme Court affirm the verdict and render judgment on 
it.  After the Florida judgment becomes final or otherwise collectable 
under Florida’s law, Victor will first realize on TortCo’s (capped) 
Florida appeal bond and employ other collection techniques against 
TortCo’s Florida assets, if any.  Then she may bring the Florida 
judgment to Virginia to seek to collect the deficiency from the judgment 
debtor’s assets in Virginia. 
Virginia’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 
(UEFJA) has straightened and smoothed the judgment creditor’s legal 
road to collection in Virginia.  The judgment creditor’s procedure in the 
 
 279. For a federal court giving full faith and credit to a state court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 
1738, see Jaffe v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co., Inc., 294 F.3d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 280. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.8, at 453-456. 
 281. Id. § 8.5(D), at 439; William Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. 
REV. 412, 419-21 (1994). 
 282. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.2, at 429; Reynolds, supra note 281, at 
417. 
 283. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.4 (2000).  See also, Carlson, supra note 27, 59 (explaining 
that under the UEFJA a judgment creditor may not file an out-of-state judgment if the judgment 
debtor has an appeal pending or bonded in the judgment state). 
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Virginia trial court is more like an administrative procedure than a 
lawsuit.284  When Victor properly files, dockets, or registers an 
authenticated copy of the final Florida judgment with the circuit clerk in 
a Virginia court, that creates the equivalent of a domestic Virginia 
judgment which triggers Virginia collection techniques.285  In short, the 
Florida (or other sister-state) judgment becomes a Virginia judgment 
when the judgment creditor files it properly in the circuit clerk’s office. 
The Virginia court will apply the United States Constitution’s Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and will accord the Florida judgment the same 
preclusive or res judicata effect that a Florida court would.  The date that 
the judgment creditor files a sister-state judgment in Virginia is the 
equivalent to the date a Virginia judgment is entered. 
The collection procedures under Virginia law then apply.  Twenty-
one days after filing and notice, the Virginia circuit clerk may issue the 
judgment creditor’s writ of execution.286  The Virginia court will notify 
TortCo, the judgment debtor, that its judgment creditor has filed the 
Florida judgment. 
During the 21-day period before the judgment creditor’s Virginia 
execution issues, the judgment debtor may interpose defenses and file 
motions.  One judgment debtor, for example, challenged a sister-state 
judgment with a motion to vacate, a motion to stay collection, and a 
motion to discharge judgment liens.287  The appeal bond and stay 
permitted under Virginia law to TortCo as a judgment debtor enter 
during this period.288  When Victor files her Florida judgment in 
Virginia, TortCo is entitled to the Virginia cap on Virginia appeal bond 
security.289  Thus, once the Florida damages judgment becomes final, 
TortCo may file a Virginia appeal bond to secure “satisfaction of the 
judgment,” unless the statutory cap of $25 million reduces the 
amount.290  The judgment creditor’s collection of the Florida judgment 
in Virginia will be stayed the same way a Virginia judgment would be 
stayed.291 
But suppose the Virginia trial judge rejects TortCo’s motions.  
 
 284. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.3, at 430. 
 285. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.2 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 286. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-466 (2000); RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 
2.2(A). 
 287. Nastro v. D’Onofrio, 822 A.2d 286, 289 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
 288. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.4 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 289. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.4 (2000). 
 290. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(C), (J) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 291. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.2 (2000 & Supp. 2005); RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra 
note 21, § 8.3. 
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TortCo’s appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court appears to lie from the 
trial judge’s decision denying its motion or motions.  The judgment 
debtor’s bond should stay the judgment creditor’s collection during the 
appeal. 
2.  What Defenses Can the Judgment Debtor Assert? 
In the judgment creditor’s streamlined UEFJA collection procedure 
in the Virginia courts, the judgment debtor has few defenses.  The 
defenses available to a judgment debtor to a judgment creditor’s 
collection of a final sister-state judgment are satisfaction, lack of 
jurisdiction, and rare types of fraud in its procurement.292 
Full faith and credit is a powerful doctrine.  Under full faith and 
credit, one creative collection-state court limited the effect of the 
collection state’s rules for reopening a domestic judgment.  The 
collection-state court, that court held, will only consider the judgment 
debtor’s constitutional defenses from the judgment state; these defenses 
are absence of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of due 
process.  As between full faith and credit and the collection state’s 
statutes for reopening a domestic judgment, the collection-state court 
will follow full faith and credit making it easier to collect a sister-state 
judgment than a domestic one.293 
Since the collection state, here Virginia, will accord the Florida 
judgment the same preclusive effect that the Florida court would, two 
defenses that are not available to the judgment debtor are that the Florida 
judgment is incorrect or that it is contrary to Virginia public policy.294 
One full-faith-and-credit defense related to punitive damages 
 
 292. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.5(A); Reynolds, supra note 281, at 422-
30. 
 293. Nastro v. D’Onofrio, 822 A.2d 286, 293 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
 294. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908); Nastro, 822 A.2d at 292-93; RENDLEMAN, 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.6(B); REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 278, at 70-72; 
Reynolds, supra note 281, at 436.  This crucial point is often missed.  See Johnson v. Johnson, 849 
N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (stating incorrectly that a collection state will give Full Faith and 
Credit to a sister-state judgment unless the judgment-state law violates the forum’s public policy).  
The point is, however, crucial: a judgment creditor’s collection of a foreign-nation judgment in the 
United States differs; not bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a court in the United States will 
decline recognition to a judgment creditor with a foreign-nation judgment that is based on 
substantive law repugnant to the forum’s public policy, the defense that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause forbids to a sister-state judgment.  ALI/UNIDROIT, supra note 12, at 155-56.  For a 
discussion of punitive damages judgments between nations, see Ronald Brand, Punitive Damages 
Revisited, Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too Far (Univ. of Pitt. 
School of Law, Working Paper Series No. 26, Aug. 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
pittlwps/papers/art26. 
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warrants a brief treatment here.  In Virginia, a judgment debtor like 
TortCo may attempt to bar a judgment creditor from collecting a sister-
state, Florida, punitive damages judgment by arguing that the Virginia 
court should refuse full faith and credit to a punitive damages judgment 
because punitive damages are “penal.” 
The Virginia court should reject the judgment debtor’s argument 
that a plaintiff’s punitive damages judgment is “penal.”  Although a 
court need not extend full faith and credit to an out-of-state “penal” 
judgment, the Virginia court ought to define “penal” narrowly to exclude 
punitive damages for full faith and credit purposes.  For a sister-state 
judgment to be “penal,” (1) its “purpose must be to punish [the 
defendant], rather than to recompense [the plaintiff],” and (2) “the 
recovery must be in favor of the state, not a private individual.”295  One 
purpose of punitive damages is to punish, but to satisfy the “penal” test, 
the plaintiff must also be the government.  If a judgment creditor like 
Victor who is a private individual seeks to collect a sister-state’s 
judgment for punitive damages, the Virginia court should reject the 
judgment debtor’s “penal” argument, grant the judgment full faith and 
credit, and domesticate it forthwith.296 
Indeed, more than 30 years ago, the Florida court gave the punitive 
damages portion of a Texas judgment full faith and credit, rejecting the 
Florida judgment debtor’s argument that punitive damages were 
“penal.”297  Two United States states whose “domestic” jurisprudence 
rejects common law punitive damages, Louisiana and Nebraska, have, in 
fact, extended full faith and credit to sister-state judgments that included 
punitive damages.298  Moreover, full faith and credit to a sister-state 
judgment for punitive damages is more clearly appropriate if, like the 
judgment-rendering state, Florida, the collection state, Virginia, has 
common law jurisprudence that includes, as does Virginia’s, punitive 
damages.299 
 
 295. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 278, at 95-97;Reynolds, supra note 281, at 435. 
 296. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.6(B).  See also, Nastro v. D’Onofrio, 
recognizing an out-of-state judgment for discovery sanctions, not challenged as penal.  822 A.2d at 
289.  Several states have diversion or split-recovery systems that carve a share out of a plaintiff’s 
punitive damages judgment and turn it over to the government.  The government’s share of a 
plaintiff’s punitive damages judgment seems “penal” under the definition in the text, and a sister-
state should not accord it full faith and credit. Although I found no direct precedent, support comes 
from McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1577-78 (M.D. Ga. 1990), and Republic 
of Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 821 F. Supp. 292, 297 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 297. Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57, 61 (Fla. 1971). 
 298. Ault v. Bradley, 564 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1990); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 
(Neb. 1975).  See also Finch, supra note 27, at 556 n.327. 
 299. JOHN COSTELLO, VIRGINIA REMEDIES § 21.08 (3d ed. 2005). 
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A contrary statement that appears in Judge W. Fletcher’s 2006 
opinion for the en banc Ninth Circuit in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre 
Le Racism et L’Antisemitisme should not alter the conclusion that 
punitive damages do not fall within the “penal” judgment exception to 
the full faith and credit owed to a sister state’s judgment.300  In dicta, in a 
part of his opinion that failed to garner a majority, Judge Fletcher wrote, 
“Thus, for example, an American court is not required to enforce an 
order of contempt or an award of punitive damages in a civil action.”301  
Two decisions are cited.  The first citation is to dicta in a family-support 
contempt: “Other jurisdictions are reluctant to give full faith and credit 
to an order for contempt due to its punitive nature.”302  This first citation 
does not involve punitive damages at all.  The second citation is to a 
choice-of-law decision in which the court declines to choose a foreign-
nation’s punitive sanction on the ground that it is contrary to forum 
public policy.303  This second citation involves a court’s initial choice of 
substantive law, neither a final judgment nor full faith and credit.304  
Indeed, in a footnote, the second court says that a state of the United 
States will allow a judgment creditor to collect a sister-state judgment 
for punitive damages.305 
Last, Judge Fletcher quotes a Comment from the Foreign Relations 
Restatement that also uses the word “state” to refer to other nations 
rather than to a state of the United States.  “Some states consider 
judgments penal for purposes of non-recognition if multiple, punitive, or 
exemplary damages are awarded, even when no governmental agency is 
a party.”306  The reader learns from the context that the Restatement 
Comment is using “states” to mean other nations, not other states within 
the United States.307  After a cross reference, the following sentence 
removes any doubt that remains: “In the United States, such judgments 
are not considered penal for this purpose.”308  Thus, nothing in Judge 
Fletcher’s Yahoo! opinion shakes my conclusion that a sister-state 
judgment for punitive damages is entitled to full faith and credit in a 
 
 300. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racism et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. (quoting Frank v. Reese, 594 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)). 
 303. See id. (citing Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 821 F.Supp. 292, 
295 (D.N.J. 1993)). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Republic of Philippines, 821 F.Supp. at 295 n.3. 
 306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483 Cmt. 
b. (1987). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
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state court within the United States. 
3.  Full Faith and Credit and Appeal-Bond Caps 
Virginia’s appeal-bond-capping statute treats domestic Virginia and 
sister-state judgments the same.309  It does not, on its face, discriminate.  
Under Full Faith and Credit Clause doctrine, the collection-state court 
applies its own procedure.  As the Supreme Court recently emphasized: 
Full faith and credit . . . does not mean that States must adopt the 
practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms 
for enforcing judgments.  Enforcement measures do not travel with the 
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain 
subject to the even-handed control of forum law.310 
This language appears to cover procedure like a state’s appeal-bond 
cap. 
A Virginia Supreme Court decision, citing Virginia use of Virginia 
procedure, allowed a Virginia court to apply a shorter Virginia statute of 
limitations to an out-of-state judgment than the statute of limitations on a 
Virginia judgment.311  If this decision governs appeal bonds, which are 
also procedural, then the cap, which applies to both domestic and out-of-
state judgments, double times past constitutional muster.312 
In our Victor v. TortCo scenario, both Florida and Virginia have 
capped their appeal bonds.  Virginia, as a collection state, may, 
consistently with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, apply its bond cap to 
a judgment creditor’s suit to collect a Florida judgment as part of 
Virginia’s domestic procedure.  A collection state with a capped appeal 
bond may apply its own procedural cap to a judgment from another state 
that lacks a cap.313  Finally, if the judgment state has capped the appeal 
bond but the judgment creditor seeks to collect it in a state without a cap, 
the collection state may follow its own procedure and require a full-
amount bond. 
 
 309. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(J) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 310. Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998). 
 311. Carter v. Carter, 349 S.E.2d 95 (Va. 1986). 
 312. There was some grumbling that the court may have decided Carter incorrectly.  
RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, § 8.7(A).  Moreover, in 2005, the Virginia General 
Assembly (1) repealed § 8.01-252, the separate ten-year statute of limitations for sister-state and 
foreign-nation judgments; and (2) provided that sister-state and foreign-nation judgments are subject 
to the twenty-year limitations period for a Virginia judgment in § 8.01-252. 
 313. Finch, supra note 27, at 506-07. 
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4.  Full Faith and Credit Summary 
In judgment creditor Victor’s full-faith-and-credit proceeding in a 
Virginia court on a fully-tried Florida tort judgment, which the Florida 
courts have affirmed on appeal, judgment debtor TortCo’s collateral 
attack has only a remote possibility of success.314  A Virginia court could 
appropriately apply the Virginia appeal-bond cap to a Florida punitive 
damages judgment.315 
A state’s appeal-bond cap coupled with an amended UEFJA do not 
appear to violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause when applied to its 
court’s recognition of a sister-state judgment for compensatory damages 
or punitive damages.  A state’s appeal-bond cap and UEFJA treat an out-
of-state judgment the same as a domestic judgment.  Moreover, since 
both are procedural, they are appropriate under the full-faith-and-credit 
doctrine that the enforcement state will apply its own procedure in a 
judgment creditor’s proceeding to collect an out-of-state judgment from 
the judgment debtor’s local assets.  The foregoing should hold even if 
the judgment state lacks an appeal bond cap but the enforcement state 
has one. 
As set forth in Part IV, above, the second wave appeal-bond 
capping statutes, including Virginia’s, that apply to all large judgments 
treat all large judgments the same.  Treating punitive damages and 
compensatory damages the same reduces discrimination that may be 
subject to a judgment creditor’s challenge under a state or federal equal 
protection clause. 
Although an appeal-bond cap does not violate the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, in a Florida judgment creditor’s UEFJA action in Virginia 
to collect a Florida judgment for punitive damages, Virginia’s capped 
appeal bond will probably neither last very long nor make much 
difference since the issues that can be litigated in the collateral 
proceeding are limited. 
B.  Federal Due Process and Equal Protection 
The rest of my constitutional analysis will be shorter and more 
straightforward.  Suppose that, after the jury returns the $250 million 
punitive damages judgment, TortCo posts an appeal bond that is capped 
at $25 million under state law.  Then Victor files a motion for a 
declaratory judgment that the bond cap rule or statute is unconstitutional 
 
 314. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, §§ 8.3, 8.4, 8.5. 
 315. Finch, supra note 27, at 518-19. 
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and for an order requiring the defendant to post a full-amount bond.  
Victor may pursue its arguments under the federal constitution and under 
the applicable state constitutions. 
A United States court’s constitutional review of most state statutes 
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal 
constitution is subject to rational-basis review.  The court will ask first 
whether the legislation is “economic regulation” and, if so, whether the 
legislature had a “rational basis” for the legislation.  A court’s rational-
basis review of a state’s economic legislation is permissive, a form of 
“anything-goes” review.  For example, in a short opinion in Smith v. 
Botsford General Hospital, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
under rational-basis review, that controlling health-care expense justified 
a cap on a medical malpractice plaintiff’s “noneconomic” damages.316 
I conclude that a legislature has a “rational basis” to enact an 
appeal-bond cap.  A legislator could think, among other things, that a 
bond cap would preserve a defendant’s constitutionally mandated post-
verdict judicial and appellate review of punitive damages under Gore 
and Campbell.317  On this new subject, I was not surprised to find direct 
precedent lacking.318 
C.  State Constitutional Protections 
Plaintiffs have assailed state tort-reform measures under state 
constitutions with mixed success.319  Each state has its own constitution, 
legal culture, set of legislative-judicial relationships, and history of tort 
reform.  Although the states’ constitutions contain many similar 
provisions, each state’s courts have the last word on what its separate 
constitution means.  Having said that, I will summarize several recent 
state constitutional decisions dealing with caps on a plaintiff’s damages 
and speculate about how an appeal-bond cap would fare. 
Tort reform in the form of an appeal-bond cap may be more 
acceptable than other tort reform legislation that caps damages.  Unlike a 
 
 316. Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 317. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2002); BMW of N. Am. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 318. Cf. Laycock, supra note 27, at 509 (explaining that the appeal bond is very likely not a 
denial of due process or equal protection.). 
 319. Compare Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43, 77-78 (Neb. 2003) 
(total cap on damages not unconstitutional), with Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 
440 (Wis. 2005) (selective cap on pain and suffering unconstitutional).  These contrasting decisions 
are discussed below.  For a summary of state constitutional law dealing with tort reform, see 
JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES Ch. 6 (4th ed., Michie 2006). 
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tort-reform statute that places a cap on a plaintiff’s recovery of 
compensatory damages and pain-and-suffering damages, an appeal-bond 
cap on a punitive-damages judgment neither singles out the most 
seriously injured for reduced compensation nor erodes the state’s 
compensation policy.  The appeal-bond cap, by contrast, by facilitating 
appellate review of a punitive damages verdict, may lend credibility to 
the state’s retributive policy and stamp the imprimatur of legitimacy on 
the jury’s verdict.  Moreover, the appeal-bond cap facilitates the judicial 
review that the Supreme Court has mandated for a punitive damages 
verdict.320  A cap on an appeal bond for a compensatory damages 
judgment, which was included in some second-wave legislation, 
however, is more difficult to justify than one on punitive damages. 
1.  Rational-Basis Review Under State Constitutions 
Under a state’s constitutional rational-basis review that resembles 
the federal courts’ “anything-goes” rational-basis review, a tort reform 
statute is economic legislation—the legislature could conclude that, in 
addition to facilitating the defendant’s appellate review, an appeal-bond 
cap preserves the state’s business climate, fosters its economic 
development, and maintains public confidence in its judicial system.321  
That would preserve the reform under state rational-basis review. 
At least one state does not subscribe to rational-basis, anything-
goes review.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ferdon v. Wisconsin 
Patient Compensation Fund, applied an equal-protection rational-basis-
with-teeth standard of review.322  Under this standard, the Ferdon court 
struck down a state cap on a plaintiff’s pain and suffering or 
“noneconomic” damages for medical malpractice.323  The court’s 
majority found that rational basis with teeth was a sufficiently capacious 
standard to allow it to scrutinize the factual basis for the arguments that 
tort reformers had adduced in the legislature to support enactment of the 
damages cap.324  The court did not find that the tort reformers’ 
arguments for the cap were persuasive enough to justify the effect that 
the cap had on the disfavored group—the most seriously injured tort 
victims.325 
 
 320. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 321. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 16 (N.C. 2004). 
 322. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 461 (Wis. 2005). 
 323. Id. at 489 
 324. Id. at 460-61. 
 325. Id. at 485.  See Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 142-48 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., 
concurring) (putting forth two reasons for a state court to construe its state constitution boldly and 
RENDLEMANFINAL.DOC5 2/26/2007  9:40:50 AM 
1162 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:1089 
It is not clear, however, that a court employing the Wisconsin 
court’s rational-basis-with-teeth standard would void an appeal-bond 
cap.  An appeal-bond cap facilitates the defendant’s appeal and the 
appellate courts’ review even as it reduces plaintiff’s settlement leverage 
and raises some risk that she will not collect all of her judgment.326  
Although plaintiff’s judgment may be for compensatory damages, which 
are the court’s redress to reimburse the plaintiff for the loss the 
defendant caused, the judgment may also include a substantial punitive 
damages component which is subject to fairly vigorous review under the 
Due Process Clause.  Arguments to void the appeal-bond cap on punitive 
damages would, thus, be less compelling than the arguments against the 
compensatory damages at issue in Ferdon.  A cap on an appeal bond for 
compensatory damages would, however, be more vulnerable than one on 
punitive damages. 
2.  Special Legislation Clauses 
“Special legislation” clauses that appear in many state constitutions 
provide a second avenue for attacking appeal-bond cap legislation under 
state constitutions.  In a 2003 decision on legislation imposing an 
absolute cap on all of a plaintiff’s damages for medical malpractice, the 
Nebraska court stated that the special legislation clause protects against 
dispensing special favors: “It is because the legislative process lacks the 
safeguards of due process and the tradition of impartiality which restrain 
the courts from using their powers to dispense special favors that such 
constitutional prohibitions against special legislation were enacted.”327 
An appeal-bond cap is a special privilege for a defendant that a jury 
has found to have committed an expensive tort.  This article has 
speculated about some of the reasons for a state legislature to pass an 
appeal-bond cap.328  The cap, in addition to reducing the judgment 
creditor’s settlement leverage, creates some risk that a judgment creditor 
will not collect her judgment.  It also treats a judgment debtor of a huge 
judgment differently than a judgment debtor of a lesser amount.  Is an 
appeal-bond cap arbitrary or unreasonable enough to flunk a state 
 
independently: first, state constitutions contain provisions to protect individual’s privacy and right-
to-remedy and to require open courts not found in the United States Constitution; and second, the 
United States Supreme Court is in retreat and diluting the United States Constitution’s protection of 
individual rights). 
 326. A statute that requires a full-amount bond for a judgment debtor that is dissipating assets 
ameliorates the plaintiff’s risk of not collecting somewhat, but probably does not eliminate it. 
 327. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43, 65 (Neb. 2003). 
 328. See supra Part V. 
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constitution’s special-legislation provision?  Does the public policy of 
facilitating the judgment debtor’s appellate review of a large judgment 
overcome the judgment creditor’s risk of nonpayment and the distinction 
between a huge and a less large judgment? 
In Nebraska, the answer to the first question is probably “no,” and 
the answer to the second question is probably “yes.”  In other words, the 
appeal-bond cap would probably survive.  The Nebraska courts have 
defined a fairly quiescent standard for reviewing a statute for compliance 
with the special-legislation provision in the state’s constitution: 
If the Legislature had any evidence to justify its reasons for passing 
the act, then it is not special legislation if the class is based upon some 
reason of public policy, some substantial difference of situation or 
circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of 
diverse legislation concerning the objects to be classified.329 
“It is commonly held that courts will not reexamine independently 
the factual basis on which a legislature justified a statute, nor will a court 
independently review the wisdom of the statute.  . . .  This court does not 
sit as a superlegislature to review the wisdom of legislative acts.”330 
Under the Nebraska court’s permissive special-legislation standard, 
if the legislature’s policy were to facilitate appellate review of a large 
judgment for either punitive damages or compensatory damages, the 
state supreme court would be likely to decline to disapprove it. 
Other states may use a less permissive review standard.  For 
example, a judgment creditor’s attack on a judgment debtor’s bond cap 
as unconstitutional special legislation might fare better in another 
Midwestern state, Illinois.  That state’s supreme court has held that a cap 
on “noneconomic” damages was arbitrary enough to be special 
legislation because of the lack of solid evidence to support the cap and 
because of its effect of under-compensating a seriously injured 
plaintiff.331  Under this standard, would an appeal-bond cap flunk the 
Illinois court’s special-legislation test?  Don’t bet the farm.  An appeal 
bond cap only creates a risk of non-payment.  The damages that the cap 
affects may be punitive, not compensatory, damages.  And the court may 
require a judgment debtor that is dissipating its assets to post a full-
amount bond. 
 
 329. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 68. 
 330. Id. at 68. 
 331. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1075-78 (Ill. 1997). 
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D.  The Vulnerability of Appeal-Bond Caps 
The first-wave caps on only punitive damages will more readily 
survive constitutional scrutiny than the second-wave caps that include 
compensatory damages.  Critically, since punitive damages are imposed 
to punish, not compensate, the Supreme Court has held that a punitive 
damages defendant is entitled to more careful post-verdict judicial 
review. 332  A punitive-damages plaintiff receives consequently less 
judicial commiseration.  This will afford judgment debtors a strong 
argument in the courts. 
The most vulnerable appeal-bond caps, it seems to me, are the 
targeted ones: (1) a bond cap for a MSA or other favored defendant but 
not for another large-judgment defendant and, (2) a variation, a more 
beneficial bond cap for a MSA or other favored defendant than for 
another defendant.333  The statutes treat a MSA large-verdict defendant 
better than another large-verdict defendant.  Suppose a defendant in a 
medical malpractice suit seeks the benefit of the cap when it appeals a 
large judgment.  Does a MSA-only appeal-bond cap violate a state 
constitution’s equal protection or special legislation provisions?  Under 
rational-basis, anything-goes review, does a legislature act on a rational 
basis by protecting the state government’s stream of MSA payments?  
Probably.334 
Even under Professor John Goldberg’s “public law” view of torts 
and tort reform, an appeal-bond cap will probably pass constitutional 
muster.  Professor Goldberg views tort law as a law that guarantees a 
plaintiff’s right to redress.  There is, he writes, “a special set of due 
process rights that entitle individuals to certain governmental structures 
and certain bodies of law.”335  Thus, a tort plaintiff has a due process 
right to a legal system that allows redress for a tortfeasor’s wrong.  She 
should, Professor Goldberg maintains, be able to sue a wrongdoer to 
vindicate her rights and interests to secure redress from a tortfeasor who 
 
 332. See supra notes 59-67 and 148-150, and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 134-138, and accompanying text. 
 334. But I am holding my nose.  Even if the MSA-sheltering statutes are not unconstitutional, 
they shine a spotlight on the state governments’ addiction to the stream of MSA revenue from 
tobacco that augments their taxes on tobacco.  The victims of this misalliance around brisk sales of 
cigarettes are the present and future smokers themselves who support the state governments directly 
through taxes and indirectly through the tobacco companies and the MSA; these are mostly low 
income people many of whom die prematurely from smoking-related maladies.  MATTHEW A. 
CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINED ITS 
CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 157-62 (2002) (discussing the Florida appeal-bond cap). 
 335. John Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a 
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 625 (2005). 
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has wrongfully injured her.336 
Professor Goldberg’s analysis is balanced and contextual.  He 
would support a decision that a total cap on damages like the Nebraska 
court approved in Gourley337 is “odious,” that is not constitutional.  A 
targeted cap like the cap on a plaintiff’s medical malpractice pain and 
suffering damages like the Wisconsin court struck down in Ferdon338 
would not be on its face unconstitutional.  A court might, however, upset 
that targeted cap as applied to a homemaker or an elderly plaintiff 
because the cap would effectively eliminate the plaintiff’s claim.339 
Professor Goldberg’s goal of securing a plaintiff’s redress should 
include facilitating a plaintiff’s collection of compensatory damages 
from a solvent defendant.  The appeal-bond cap appears not to offend.  
Since we have no evidence that appeal-bond caps have prevented 
plaintiffs from collecting their judgments, the argument that a cap is 
improper seems, under this analysis, to be premature and perhaps 
strained. 
VII.  SUMMATION 
The appeal bond began its life as a servile drudge, a procedural 
technique to accommodate the judgment creditor’s need to collect her 
judgment promptly with the judgment debtor’s conflicting need for 
judicial review.  Plaintiffs’ huge punitive damages verdicts transformed 
it.  I have used Victor’s products liability judgment regarding a Gizmo 
gone awry for $250 million, $225 million of it punitive damages, as an 
example.  Many recent mega-verdicts were entered in smokers’ lawsuits 
against tobacco companies.  Tobacco companies and actual and potential 
defendants with exposure to enormous verdicts convinced state 
legislatures to perceive uncapped appeal bonds as a menace to orderly 
justice, to the defendants’ solvency, and to their states’ economies.  The 
tort reformers’ effort succeeded: two waves of tort reform statutes 
capped appeal bonds in well over half the states. 
The states’ appeal-bond capping statutes present problems of 
constitutional law that turn out to be more interesting than difficult.  
Because of states’ streamlined procedure to collect a judgment, the 
effect of a state’s cap on a large sister-state judgment will be neither 
protracted nor momentous.  A state’s capping statute is also likely, but 
 
 336. Id. at 529. 
 337. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43, 77-78 (Neb. 2003). 
 338. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 339. Goldberg, supra note 335, at 621-22. 
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not certain, to pass the federal constitutional tests.  Finally, the judgment 
creditor’s possible state constitutional challenges to the caps will also 
probably fail; the observer can be confident, without being certain, that 
an appeal-bond cap will survive state constitutional testing in most 
states. 
What advice do I have?  A full-amount, no-discretion surety bond 
for an appeal is too rigid.  More flexibility is needed because of at least 
four developments: huge businesses, consumer-protection punitive 
damages based on the defendant’s wealth, plaintiff class actions for 
damages that aggregate thousands of plaintiffs’ claims, and post-verdict 
judicial review of punitive damages based on the Due Process Clause.  A 
superior procedure would start by presuming that an appellant will 
supply a full-amount surety bond for plaintiff’s security; but it would 
also allow an appellant to show “good cause” as a prerequisite for the 
judge’s discretion to vary the amount and form of security. 
Should the appeal-bond statute include a cap?  The need for the 
legislature to protect a defendant like TortCo that a jury has found to 
have been a grave tortfeasor under that state’s or another state’s law and 
liable to Victor for $250 million punitive damages and compensatory 
damages may seem attenuated.  Are the appeal-bond capping statutes 
this article has examined wise and expedient public policy?  True 
special-interest legislation, an appeal-bond cap obviously protects an 
unlikely underdog; its chief beneficiary is a large-scale tortfeasor like 
TortCo.  Is the apparent tortfeasor’s difficulty of posting an appeal bond 
unworthy of the legislature’s attention?  Is an appeal-bond cap special 
justice for the undeserving rich? 
How does an appeal-bond cap affect the plaintiff?  By facilitating 
defendant’s appeal, a cap will tend to protract the process, delay that 
favors the defendant.  A cap will alter the parties’ strategies for 
negotiating a settlement after a plaintiff’s verdict; but the plaintiff who 
loses this economic leverage is not losing legitimate pressure.  A cap 
that does not cover all of plaintiff’s judgment will reduce, in unknown 
ways, plaintiff’s ability to collect her judgment. 
Although several of the tort reformer’s arguments for an appeal-
bond cap are shaky, one has substance.  The tort reformer’s strongest 
argument is that an appeal-bond cap facilitates the defendant’s appellate 
review.  An appeal to  correct trial errors and create legal precedent is an 
integral part of a system of justice that this article has called lower-case 
due process.  “[J]ustice delayed is better than no justice at all . . . .”340 
 
 340. Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 O.J.L.S. 235, 239 (2006). 
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How much facilitation is appropriate?  Professor Finch suggested 
that a state legislature should abolish the appeal-bond requirement for a 
defendant’s stay on a punitive damages judgment.341 
My position is a middle one.  An unbonded punitive-damages 
appeal discounts the jury’s verdict and the plaintiff’s apparent right to 
collect her money.  A legislature might, however, under the aegis of 
protecting the plaintiff’s interest as well, consider a generally applicable 
appeal-bond procedure like the original discretionary provisions that, if 
defendant demonstrates good cause, grants the judge case-by-case 
discretion in setting the amount and allowing alternative types of 
security.342 
In a defendant’s bet-the-company appeal where the plaintiff’s 
judgment exceeds the defendant’s assets, the judge might bond the 
appeal at the value of the defendant’s assets.343  Detouring a little from 
the cap, an appeal-bond statute should augment the judge’s discretion by 
waiving an appeal bond for an indigent judgment debtor with neither 
money for a bond premium nor assets to dissipate during an appeal.344 
The argument for a cap on a defendant’s appeal bond for a 
plaintiff’s punitive damages judgment is, on balance, persuasive.  First, 
punitive damages are not compensatory, not needed to make the plaintiff 
“whole.”  Punitive damages fulfill a public purpose; they punish and 
deter actual and potential malefactors.  Second, the Constitution 
commands a more rigorous post-verdict judicial review for punitive 
damages than for compensatory damages,345 and a cap eases defendant’s 
access to that appellate review where a high percentage of huge 
judgments for punitive damages will be reduced. 
I have discovered no record of judgment debtors shielded behind 
appeal-bond caps evading payment to plaintiffs.  If abuses arise, I will 
revisit this conclusion. 
The tort reformers’ arguments for an appeal-bond cap to ameliorate 
a defendant’s appeal of a compensatory-damages judgment, however, 
 
 341. Finch, supra note 27, at 525-27.  See also Unif. Law Comm’rs’ Model Punitive Damages 
Act § 13, 14 U.L.A 338 (2005). 
 342. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(E)(2000 & Supp. 2005); Mark Kravitz, Appellate Law: 
Stays Pending Appeal, NAT’L L.J., April 2, 2001, at A10. 
 343. Laycock, supra note 27, at 515. 
 344. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-676.1(N) (2000 & Supp. 2005).  Professor Laycock’s view is that a 
statute that requires an indigent to post a bond is “irrational.”  Laycock, supra note 27, at 515.  A 
plaintiff that sues a defendant who lacks non-exempt assets to pay a judgment may also be 
“irrational.”  That “irrational” plaintiff may have sued to establish a principle; moreover as a 
judgment creditor, it may file a judgment lien in case the judgment debtor inherits land, and it ought 
to pay attention to whether its debtor wins the lottery. 
 345. See supra notes 59-67 and 148-150, and accompanying text. 
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fail to persuade me.  The reasons I gave above to favor a cap on a 
defendant’s bond on punitive damages are absent for a defendant’s 
appeal of a plaintiff’s verdict for the compensatory damages that 
ameliorate a tort victim’s actual suffering. 
What size of punitive damages verdict should lead to an appeal-
bond cap?  The list of verdicts in The National Law Journal’s special 
section, “Verdict Search for The Top 100 Verdicts of 2005” lumps 
compensatory damages and punitive damages together.346  A $25 million 
cap on all damages would cap the first 68 verdicts on the 2005 list; a $50 
million cap the first 26; a $100 million cap the first 16.347  The 
accompanying story supplies the totals within the top 100 verdicts—“In 
2005, punitive damages totaled $3.5 billion, while nonpunitive damages 
equaled $4.7 billion.”348 
Any specific figure that I recommend has an arbitrary quality.  I 
suggest a $25-50 million cap on a defendant’s appeal bond for punitive 
damages. 
My conclusions: The legislature should start with a presumptive 
full-amount appeal bond and (1) grant the trial judge discretion, if the 
appellant demonstrates good cause, to reduce any appeal bond or to 
provide alternative security; and (2) cap the appellant’s appeal bond on a 
punitive-damages judgment, but not on one for compensatory damages, 
at $25-50 million.349 
When this article began, a jury had just rendered a verdict in favor 
of Victor and against TortCo, in the amount of $250 million.  Of that 
amount, $225 million constituted punitive damages.  Under the proposed 
legislation, if TortCo didn’t show “good cause,” TortCo’s appeal would 
be bonded for the full amount of Victor’s $25 million compensatory 
damages, but the cap would limit TortCo’s bond on the $225 million 
punitive damages to either $25 or $50 million.  Hoping that justice is 
done on appeal, we leave TortCo and Victor on the threshold of briefing 
and arguing the appeal. 
For perspective after our long tour of Tort Hells, let’s stroll through 
the Elysian Fields.  Washington and Lee, where I work, is in Rockbridge 
County, Virginia.  A conversation in early June, 2006, with Bruce 
 
 346. The Verdict Search 100, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 20, 2006, at S2. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Jones, supra note 231, at S2.  The trial verdicts in the list are subject to the trial judges’ 
decision on defendants’ post-trial motions; the trial judges may reduce or eliminate the verdicts 
before they ripen into appealable judgments. 
 349. The statute that comes the closest to the recommendation is Idaho’s with the cap amount 
raised.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202(2) (West, Westlaw through all 2006 laws of the 2d Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 1). 
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Patterson, Rockbridge County’s Circuit Clerk, confirmed my impression 
that Rockbridge juries are, in Bruce’s words, “tight-fisted.”  To begin 
with, the county has only a few civil jury trials every year, as of mid-
June, only one in 2006, a dispute about a remodeling project run amok.  
Over half of Rockbridge jury verdicts favor the defense.  Jury awards are 
usually “meds only,” sometimes with lost wages.  The reader will mark 
the scarcity of pain and suffering in the Elysian Fields.  The largest 
Rockbridge jury verdict was in the $400,000 range, and there have been 
only a few others in the $100,000 range, one a death case. 
Punitive damages are as scarce as hens’ teeth in Rockbridge 
County.  In his 28 years of attending jury trials in the county courthouse, 
Clerk Patterson does not remember a punitive damages verdict; if there 
has been one, it was not large.350  Few civil cases are appealed; the 
Virginia Supreme Court, which has discretionary jurisdiction, denies 
most applications.  Bruce has seen appeal bonds for costs, usually $500, 
cash; but he does not remember approving a defendant-appellant’s 
supersedeas bond to secure a plaintiff’s verdict. 
The verdicts and judgments that this article considered are the Big 
Ones, those extraordinary instances beyond normal experience that a 
social scientist would call “outriders.”  But a gargantuan jury verdict is 
an actual event that a procedural system must recognize and 
accommodate.  I maintain that an appeal-bond cap on a defendant’s 
appeal from a plaintiff’s mammoth punitive damages judgment, 
although not required by constitutional Due Process, is a beneficial 
lower-case due process technique to facilitate a decision on the merits in 
the defendant’s appeal and to bolster the integrity of the legal process. 
Turning the kaleidoscope slightly in closing, I will inquire whether 
the tort reformers’ accomplishments that I review above are merely 
successful skirmishes against an approaching endgame that will snuff 
out big tobacco.  Although the auguries from the plaintiffs’ failed class 
actions in Engle and Price point in the opposite direction,351 the 
momentum from the individual smokers’ lawsuits may portend an 
inexorable denouement for a product that lacks positive attributes.  If so, 
appeal-bond caps will facilitate tobacco defendants’ post-verdict judicial 
review of jury verdicts; they will prolong the courts’ deliberations and 
delay the plaintiffs’ collection; but the caps will also assist the legal 
system in securing accurate decisions and public acceptance.  
 
 350. Rockbridge County’s dearth of punitive damages verdicts was excluded from a recent 
study of punitive damages which featured only populous counties.  Eisenberg, supra note 101. 
 351. But see, Schwab v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y 2006) (certifying a class 
of “light” cigarette smokers). 
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Concluding his Ages of American Law, Grant Gilmore observed that 
“[i]n Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be 
meticulously observed.”352 
 
 352. GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977). 
